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In the last thirty years an increasing number of governments are taking an interest in the 
growth rate and age structure of their populations.  The chief concern among advanced 
economies is that pay-as-you-go pension and health care systems for the elderly will be 
unsustainable as the ratio of younger workers to older beneficiaries shrinks from aging 
populations.  Resistance to reforms such as reduced or delayed benefits, or higher taxes 
has focused attention on a third option, growing the working-age population.  There is a 
growing consensus on the economic benefits of population growth, a reversal from the 
1960s through 80s.  Governments try to grow the population through incentives for more 
children and/or accepting more immigrants.  This report compares the population policies 
of Singapore, the United States, France, and Japan to analyze governments' motives and 
policy  outcomes.   Middle-income  nations  like  China  and  Brazil  can  learn  from  the 
vii
experiences of developed nations to avoid the same predicament in the future.   Each 
government's mix of fertility incentives, immigrants, and guest workers is a product of 
their  economic  and political  circumstances.   The surest  way to  grow the  population, 
accepting  immigrants,  is  usually  the  least  popular.   The  most  popular  is  the  most 
unproven, providing benefits for larger families.  There is no consensus what the most 
effective  fertility  incentives  are.   Population  policy  has  never  been  just  about  the 
economy, it is steeped in political and cultural visions.  Shedding that political baggage is 
a prerequisite to a more rational, sustainable policy approach to demography.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
Rapid declines in fertility and increases in old age life expectancy in developed 
nations raise the specter of insolvent pension systems, higher taxes, and lower standards 
of  living.   Policy-makers  have been slow to  appreciate  the  public  policy  impacts  of 
population growth and age structure.  Most developed nations are now trying grow their 
population to varying degrees and mixed results.   This report  answers three research 
questions: What historical and economic factors explain population policy?  What is the 
demographic future of advanced economies?  How can public policy affect demographic 
destiny?  I use four case studies in my analysis: Singapore, the United States, France, and 
Japan.   Comparing  national  experiences  with  population  policy  compares  different 
responses to a common demographic story, offering lessons on what works, what does 
not, and why.  These nations cover a wide range of the developed world because each has 
unique cultural, political, and economic circumstances that affect political demography.
Why should a student of public policy study demography?  Population change and 
age structures profoundly affect public finances, economic growth, and quality of life. 
Demographic transition from a young population to old emphasizes different government 
services throughout  the transition.   A young population will  require higher education 
spending.  Prisons expand to accommodate the surge in risk-taking young men.  Schools 
and prisons shrink as the population ages, and the country enters a fiscal Golden Age in 
which a large share of the population is paying taxes and consuming fewer government 
services.
But the Golden Age inevitably transitions to an age of hard decisions as people 
retire and begin to consume pensions, health care, and nursing homes.  The need for 
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ob/gyns and pediatricians gives way to gerontologists, oncologists, and a lot of nurses. 
Medical research, having conquered most problems affecting the young, shifts focus to 
old age conditions.  In developed countries, education is the largest public expenditure on 
children.  For the elderly, pensions, health care, and nursing homes are the largest draws 
on  the  treasury.   Will  a  shrinking  student  population  offset  the  growing  senior 
population?  Empirical evidence suggests it will not.  American per pupil primary and 
secondary education spending for the 2009/2010 school year was $10,451.1  Per capita 
Social Security spending in 2009 was $14,184 and Medicare $11,743.2  This  estimate 
shows per capita American public spending on the 65+ population is roughly 2.4 times 
that of the 0-18 population.
The demographic transition has caused a decline of the family as a social safety 
net.  Families have historically been the safety net against unemployment, disability, and 
old age.  Large and extended families living close together spread the risk.  In developed 
nations, smaller “nuclear” families have come to rely on the government to provide those 
services  in  lieu  of  the  extended family.3  Many  elderly  who  used to  live  with  their 
children can now afford to live independently or in a nursing home thanks to pension and 
social welfare systems.  The extended family was often the source of money for college, 
to start a business, and a foot in the employment door.  As family sizes shrunk, citizens 
have turned to the government to provide services in a rational, equitable manner.
Policy-makers  can  shift  these  trends  through  careful  examination  and 
implementation of population policy.
1 “Projections of Education Statistics to 2018”, National Center for Education Statistics, web, 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/projections/projections2018/tables/table_34.asp, accessed March 15, 2011.
2 Medicare Trustees Report 2010, https://www.cms.gov/ReportsTrustFunds/downloads/tr2010.pdf, 
accessed March 15, 2011.
3 Rudolf Andorka, Determinants of Fertility in Advanced Societies, London: Methuen, 1978. P. 21.
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1.2 POPULATION POLICY
What is population policy?  Unlike education or transportation policy, population 
policy cannot be easily defined.  Many public policies affect parents' decisions on when 
to  have  children  and  how many to  have,  from urban  planning  to  health  care  to  the 
economy.  Most countries have a set of policies that deal directly with marriage and 
fertility.   Population  policy  motives  are  diverse,  from humanitarianism  to  economic 
development to national security to long-term fiscal sustainability.
Policies that promote fertility are called “pro-natalist” policies.  “Anti-natalist” 
policies discourage fertility.  With the notable exception of China's One Child Policy, 
most anti-natalist policies are inadvertent.  However, family planning in the developing 
world  is  often  promoted  as  much  for  its  anti-natalist  effects  as  humanitarian  relief 
because  of  the  belief  that  lower  fertility  helps  development  (more  on  this  theory  in 
chapter 2).  Policies affecting marriage and fertility are known as family policies.  Most 
developed nations offer incentives for marriage and having children.  The most common 
path to having children in the developed world looks like this:
Men:
Meet partner  Find stable job  Find own living space  Get married  → → → →
Have children
Women:
Meet partner  Find stable job  Find own living space  Get married  → → → →
Weigh children's impact on finances and career  Have children→
3
To promote the end result, policies try to break down barriers to each step.  For example, 
the Singaporean government organizes social events for singles to facilitate that first step. 
Other common pro-natalist policies include:
 Tax deductions for children, especially second and third children
 Cash grants for newborn children
 Subsidized daycare
 Maternity and paternity leave
 Education promotes parenthood
 Limited access to contraceptives and abortion
Common anti-natalist policies include:
 Promotion of family planning
 Penalties for large families
 Education emphasizes the dangers of over-population
Pro-natalist policies attack the direct and indirect costs of having a child.  Direct 
costs  are the expenses of  raising a child.   Indirect  costs  are the opportunity costs  of 
working  less  and  falling  behind  on  career  development.   Low-income families  have 
similar direct costs to but lower opportunity costs than high-income families.  Thus cash 
grants  are  greater  incentives  to  low-income  families  than  family  leave  policies. 
Conversely, family leave policies are more tempting to high-income families than cash 
grants because the opportunity cost to a high-income couple is higher.
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As of 2009, 136 countries have a policy on population according to the United 
Nations  (UN)  Population  Division.4  Of  those,  36  promote  population  growth,  67 
discourage it, and 33 seek to maintain their current population.  Table 1 shows the rise in  
pro-growth policies between 1976 and 2009.  Pro-growth means the government wants to 
grow the population either through higher fertility rates or immigration.  The latter two 
categories  in  Table  1  are  more  specific.   There  has  been tremendous  growth  in  the 
number of countries that promote higher fertility rates, from 13 in 1976 to 40 in 2009. 
Liberal immigration policies remain less popular, with only 16 countries actively seeking 
more immigrants.
4 “World Population Policies 2009 Database.” United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 




















Table 1: Rise in pro-growth population policies according to the UN Population 
Division: 1976 - 2009
1.3 THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION MODEL
Western industrialization in the 19th century created enormous population growth 
through improvements in agriculture, public health, and medicine.  Annual death rates 
declined faster than fertility rates.  The population boom led some demographers like 
Thomas Malthus to predict population growth would outstrip growth in the food supply 
and lead to widespread poverty (more on Malthus in chapter 2).  But as industrialization 
matured in  the 19th and 20th centuries,  demographers  realized that  fertility  rates  were 
dropping as well, sometimes faster than death rates.  The American demographer Warren 
Thompson first theorized the Demographic Transition Model in 1929 which describes the 
transition from an under-developed economy to developed economy in terms of birth and 
death rates (see figure 1).5
5 Andorka, 18.
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All developed nations are in stage 4, characterized by small changes in annual 
birth and death rates.  Note that the demographic transition model does not account for 
immigration so a developed nation's population can increase in-spite of low fertility, as is 
the case with Singapore.  Stage 3 includes wealthier under-developed nations like South 
Africa and Malaysia.  Stage 2 includes most Middle Eastern and African countries, while 
stage 1 is the domain of only war torn and despotic states such as Iraq from 2003-2007 
and North Korea.  Figure 2 shows Japan's demographic transition from 1872 to 2004. 
Death rates rise slower then fall faster than birth rates throughout industrialization and the 
post-war period.  Births rise then fall rapidly after the war.  Death rates increase slightly 
7
Figure 1: Demographic transition model, drawn by author
from the 1980s because of an aging population.  Population growth slows through post-
industrialization and by 2008 the population had begun to decrease. 
The good news is demography is relatively predictable.  Note how smooth the 
lines are for Japan's demographic transition after 1945.  With no threat of a Great Power 
war or catastrophic pandemic, developed nations' populations will not suffer unexpected 
reductions.  Medical incrementalism means we can expect small,  steady reductions in 
infant mortality and increases in old age survival rates.  Demographers and economists 
can easily project  populations based on the natural  increase.   But population policies 
change things because no one knows how many immigrants a government will accept 
over the next decade, or what incentives for child-bearing it will offer.
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Figure 2: Japan's demographic transition: 1872 - 2004
1.4 THE DEMOGRAPHIC-ECONOMIC PARADOX
The demographic-economic paradox is the observation that poorer couples tend to 
have more children than wealthier couples.  It is represented across income groups within 
a single country, across the globe between rich and poor countries, and over time for a 
single  country.   A conclusion from the 1974 UN World  Population Conference  was 
“development is the best contraceptive.”6  The difference in fertility rates is a paradox 
because intuitive thinking is that fertility decisions are a function of the means to support 
the children.  A wealthy family can support more children so why do they have fewer?
The  answer  to  the  demographic-economic  paradox  is  four-fold.   First,  when 
public health systems were weaker, infant and youth mortality were higher.  A woman 
had to give birth  to  more children than she wanted knowing some would die before 
reaching adulthood.  As infant and youth mortality declined, she could give birth to the 
exact number of children wanted.7  Second, children start working later and require more 
investment in advanced economies.  Children can go to work at a very young age in 
agrarian societies, mid-teens in industrial societies, and 18+ in post-industrial societies 
where  education  rather  than  physical  labor  is  key.   Societal  expectations  of  what 
constitutes  good  parents  raise  the  cost  of  children.   Grown  children  have  more 
independence  in  an  urban  environment  and  contribute  less  to  the  family.8  As  an 
economic investment, children made less sense to parents throughout industrialization.9 
Society still reaped a net benefit from their labor.  Rationale for children shifted from 
economic and sentimental to mostly just sentimental.  The divergence in parental and 
societal economic interests regarding family size underpins population policy today.
6 Massimo Livi-Bacci, A Concise History of World Population, 3rd ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001. P. 
149.




Third,  modern  birth  control  methods  have  reduced  the  number  of  unwanted 
children.   Couples  have always practiced folk birth  control  methods including coitus 
interruptus,  menstrual  cycle  timing,  prolonging  breast  feeding,  crude  abortions,  and 
infanticide.   Their  effectiveness  could  not  compare  to  that  of  modern  birth  control 
methods.  Modern contraceptives have proven more popular because they are safer and 
more effective.
These  three  explanations  help  explain  why  fertility  rates  drop  as  a  nation 
develops: health systems improve and the economic rationale for children fades away. 
But they do not explain differences between socio-economic groups in the same country 
who are part of the same health and education systems as wealthier, less-fertile couples. 
The  fourth  explanation  of  the  demographic-economic  paradox  looks  to  family 
backgrounds and culture.  The personal value of children is heavily influenced by one's 
parents and peers.  Parental backgrounds and values influence the likelihood a daughter 
goes  to  college,  which  delays  and  reduces  fertility.   Since  religions  tend  to  glorify 
children, religious people tend to want more children and use less birth control.  There is 
also an urban-rural divide that encompasses cultural differences.  Rural families tend to 
be more traditional and poorer than urban families, and there is an economic advantage to 
large families.  The family background determinants of fertility are important in tailoring 
fertility incentives (more on this in section 4.2).
1.5 POPULATION POLICY INDICATORS
Demographers use two metrics to analyze population: total fertility rate (TFR), or 
fertility rate for short, and dependency ratios.  Total fertility rate (TFR) is the number of 
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children a woman can be expected to have in her lifetime.10  It accounts for the delay in 
child-bearing as women get an education and start a career before marriage.  A TFR of 
2.1 in developed countries is generally considered replacement because there need to be 
two children to replace the two parents, and some will never have children of their.  A 
TFR more than 2.1 is considered a positive natural growth rate because the two parents 
are  replaced  by  more  than  two  children.   In  developing  countries  with  high  infant 
mortality rates and other problems affecting youth, the replacement rate is higher.  A TFR 
less than 2.1 indicates negative natural growth.
TFR's political significance is that if it is less than 2.1, immigration is necessary 
to maintain a stable population.  Immigration policy can be extraordinarily contentious, 
even in countries that historically welcomed immigrants.
10 “Definitions and Notes.” CIA World Factbook, web, accessed 1 Jan. 2011, 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/notesanddefs.html#T>.
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Figure 3: Comparative fertility rates: 1960 - 2008
Figure 3 shows the decline in total fertility rates among the four case studies from 
1960 to 2008, a period of sustained economic development.  Singapore and Japan have 
seen nearly continual decline since 1960, which the United States and France have seen a 
slight rise since the 1980s.
Dependency ratios show the age structure of a population.   They measure the 
proportion of the population that is dependent on the working population.  The traditional 
dependency ratio is calculated:
Total dependency ratio (TDR) =  Population ages 0-14  +  Population aged 65+
                         ______________________________________
       Population ages 15-64
The child dependency ratio is the population of those ages 0-14 divided by the 
population ages  15-64, and the old age dependency ratio  is  the population aged 65+ 
divided by the population ages 15-64.  This assumes people start working at age 15 and 
retire at 65.  In reality, most people in developed nations do not start working until 18-22 
as they finish high school and college.  Retirement ages vary in developed nations from 
60-67 and many continue working in retirement.  The traditional dependency ratio is 
imperfect but still useful in measuring the economic impact of aging.  A low dependency 
ratio is desirable because it maximizes the population's productivity.  Those aged 15-64 
require the fewest public services, while those aged 65+ require the most.
12
13










Old Age Dependency Ratios: 1950 - 2010
Population aged 65+ divided by ages 20-64





Figure 5: Comparative old age dependency ratios: 1950 - 2010









Total Dependency Ratios: 1950 - 2010
Population ages 0-19, 65+ divided by ages 20-64





Figure 4: Comparative total dependency ratios: 1950 - 2010
Figures  4 and 5  show the  total  dependency ratio  (defined in  this  case  as  the 
population ages 0-19 and 65+ divided by ages 20-64) and old age dependency ratios 
(defined as the population 65+ divided by ages 20-64) of Singapore, the United States, 
France, and Japan.  The TDR slopes downward as the post-World War II population 
bulge that moves through middle age.  But the old age dependency ratio is rising.
Table 2 shows the change in dependency ratios from 1990 to 2030 (projected).11 
France and Japan's dependency ratios increased from 1990 to 2011 while Singapore and 
11 The Singapore projections for 2030 are inaccurate because the U.S. Census assumed that its immigration 
boom in the 1990s and 2000s was only temporary, according to an email from the Census' Chief of the 
Population Studies Branch on Feb. 14, 2011.  They will be revising their projections later in 2011.  The 




1990 2011 2030 1990 2011 2030
Total 37.1% 29.9% 54.9% 52.0% 49.7% 63.5%
Child 29.4% 17.9% 17.1% 33.0% 30.1% 31.9%
Old Age 7.7% 12.0% 37.8% 19.0% 19.7% 31.6%
Share 65+ 5.6% 9.2% 24.4% 12.5% 13.1% 19.3%
Share 0-19 29.8% 19.5% 15.1% 28.8% 27.0% 26.2%
France Japan
1990 2011 2030 1990 2011 2030
Total 51.9% 54.5% 65.3% 43.6% 56.3% 69.2%
Child 30.9% 28.7% 27.5% 26.4% 20.5% 18.1%
Old Age 21.0% 25.9% 37.9% 17.2% 35.8% 51.1%
Share 65+ 13.8% 16.8% 22.9% 12.0% 22.9% 30.2%
Share 0-19 27.9% 24.5% 22.5% 26.5% 17.9% 14.7%
Source: U.S. Census
Table 2: Comparative dependency ratios: 1990 - 2030
the United States' decreased because of strong immigration that adds population to the 
15-64 bracket.  Note the shift in dependency ratios from young to old, indicating that 
public services will be catering increasingly to the elderly.
Children are a positive externality because the people bearing most of the costs—
their parents—are not the ones who reap most of the economic benefits—the national 
economy.  Advanced societies have developed to the point where the economic rationale 
for  children  from  the  parents'  perspective  has  mostly  disappeared,  leading  to  fewer 
children.   In  absence  of  large-scale  immigration,  aging is  the  inevitable  result.   The 
natural policy response to a positive externality is to subsidize it.  Another option is to 
accept more immigrants.
Chapter 2 reviews the modern intellectual debate on whether population growth is 
good or bad.  It will provide the backdrop to the policies seen in chapter 3.  Chapter 3 
compares the old age support systems and population policies of Singapore, the United 
States, France, and Japan to understand the political and economic context for population 
policies.   I  compare developed nations because they are seeing the most acute aging 
trends.  Developing nations like China and Brazil will almost certainly face the same 
problems in a few decades.  They can learn from the experiences of developed nations to 
prevent the same problems befalling them.
Chapter 4 analyzes the determinants of population policy and evaluates the key 
policies.  I recommend further areas of research and suggest ways adapt old age support 
systems for aging.  This is where developing nations like China and Brazil can learn from 
others' successes and mistakes.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.1 OVERVIEW
Public policy is a function of the nation's historical and economic context, among 
other factors.  The wide range of perspectives and policies on population surveyed in 
chapter 3 is better understood through the shifting intellectual debate on demography.
For  the  vast  trajectory  of  human  civilization,  society  has  encouraged  large 
families and population growth.  More people meant more farmers, soldiers, craftsmen 
who yielded more wealth, power, and territory.  People were put to work at a young age, 
reproduced  as  soon  as  physiologically  possible,  and  died  at  a  relatively  young  age 
compared to today.  Childhood and retirement, if the latter came at all, were so short that 
there was little burden on families.  Only in the last two hundred out of six thousand 
years  of  recorded  history  have  thinkers  concerned  themselves  with  ideas  of  over-
population  and  unsustainable  growth.   Some  intellectuals  and  policy-makers  with 
different ideologies promoted population growth.  In the 1950s and 60s, an academic bloc 
coalesced around the idea that rapid population growth was dangerous to social stability, 
prosperity, and international security.  They pressed policy-makers around the world to 
control population.  They joined womens' rights advocates in promoting access to birth 
control in the developing world.
Starting in the 1980s, the pendulum within academia began to swing back toward 
population growth being good.  Economists and demographers forecasting populations 
decades into the future for Japan and Western Europe saw population decline without 
immigration.   Aging and population decline's  effects on economics and public policy 
became new subjects for research.
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This  sections  surveys  the  modern  history  of  thought  on  the  key  question  of 
population policy: is population growth good or bad?  There is a vast body of literature 
on demography so the section will only be an overview of the main people and ideas 
around the question.
2.2 IS POPULATION GROWTH GOOD OR BAD?
Traditional societies and religions have long celebrated children.  In Genesis 1:28 
of the Old Testament, God commands Adam and Eve to “Be fruitful and multiply and fill 
the Earth and subdue it”.12  In the Qur'an, children are considered a gift from Allah.13  In 
the Islamic Hadith, the Prophet Mohammad advises a man to marry women capable of 
bearing many children: “He (the Prophet) said: Marry women who are loving and very 
prolific, for I shall outnumber the peoples by you.”14  Modern religious authorities uphold 
these ancient views.  Pope Paul VI denounced population control in his 1965 speech to 
the UN General  Assembly,  saying leaders should “strive to  multiply bread so that  it 
suffices for the tables of mankind, and not rather favor an artificial control of birth, which 
would be irrational, in order to diminish the number of guests at the banquet of life”.15 
Intellectuals and policy-makers in the modern era (1800 to present) have been all 
over  the  map  regarding  population  growth.   This  section  chronicles  the  modern 
intellectual history of opinions on population growth.
12 The HarperCollins Study Bible, published 1989, 1st edition.
13 An-Nahl 16:72. English Translation of the Message of the Qur'an. Trans. Syed V. Ahamed.
14 Book 11, No. 2045. Sunan Abu-Dawud translation.
15 Pope Paul VI, "Pope Paul VI on Population and Development", Population and Development Review 4, 
3 (1978): 540.
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2.3 FIRST ERA OF MODERN DEMOGRAPHY
The modern era of demography starts with Thomas Robert Malthus, an English 
Anglican minister writing around the turn of the 19th century.  Malthus wrote An Essay 
on Population in 1798 to express his fears that population growth was outstripping food 
production.16  He called this the “principle of population”, something that amounted to a 
natural law of civilization.  Declining food per capita would cause ever more misery for 
the lower classes unless checked by self-restraint, war, or disease.  The essay was a social 
look at contemporary history in Western Europe, a time when the Industrial Revolution 
was contributing to rapid population growth.  However, Malthus did not use quantitative 
analysis with historical data, mainly because very little existed in the late 18 th century. 
The first  English census began in 1801, and England established the first  registry of 
births and deaths in 1837.17  He stated that as time went on, conditions for the poor and 
then upper classes would worsen.
Such was Malthus' first edition of An Essay on Population.  Subsequent editions 
theorized  social  policies  to  encourage  self-restraint  in  fertility.   Calling  it  “moral 
restraint”,  Malthus  said  people  should  delay  marriage  until  able  to  support  a  family 
financially, and the unmarried should be celibate.  A married family could then have as 
many children as it wanted, contingent on financial means.18  These two principles would 
be sufficient to keep population growth in-check; the government did not need to get 
deeply  involved  in  family  planning.   Malthus  did  not  oppose  all  population  growth 
because  he  saw  child-baring  as  a  necessary  prerequisite  to  economic  prosperity. 
Interestingly,  Malthus  disapproved  of  artificial  birth  control  both  because  it 
accommodated  pre-marital  “immoral”  lifestyles  and  lowered  fertility  rates  within 




families.19  Emigration was only a short-term solution that kicked the can down the road; 
eventually  there  were  would  be  no  land  to  emigrate  to  and  the  problems  Malthus 
described would set in.20
Malthus' “principle of population” was a radical idea but his policy prescriptions 
were  moderate for his time.  He clashed with other authors advocating more extreme and 
heavy-handed methods of population control.  Yet, like other important intellectuals of 
the 19th century such as Charles Darwin and Karl Marx, his name was tarnished by later 
attempts at applying his ideas to policy.  Academics have used the term “Malthusian” in 
every  anti-population  growth  context  for  the  last  two  centuries,  usually  to  discredit 
population control policies.  Malthus turned out to be empirically wrong on the assertion 
that  population growth outstrips  food production,  a  fact  that  was evident  only a  few 
decades after publication when better demographic and economic data became available. 
But his analysis on fertility self-restraint has a lot of relevance to modern theories of the 
decline  in  fertility  described in  section 1.4.   Malthus  advocated people restrain from 
having kids until they felt it was financially viable, the main reason citizens of developed 
countries  also  practice  self-restraint  (albeit  through  different  methods  than  Malthus 
proposed).
Karl  Marx  strongly  disagreed  with  Malthus.   Marx  saw  more  population  as 
economically beneficial because society would have more labor and thus more wealth.21 
Writing  in  Capital,  Marx  coined  the  phrase  “reserve  army of  labor”  to  describe  the 
unemployed, who were, in Marx's eyes, unemployed not because population growth out-





wages.  Thus the capitalist system was inefficient and exploitative.22  In other words, 
capitalism,  not  rapid  population  growth,  was  to  blame for  poverty  among the  lower 
classes.   For  these  reasons,  Marx opposed population  control  measures  aimed at  the 
working class that he saw as attempts to forestall a revolution.
Malthus and Marx's concern for population growth arose from an international 
humanitarian interest (with divergent views of whether it was good or bad), but other 
thinkers in the 19th and early 20th centuries looked to power.  European nationalism in 
18th  and  19th  centuries  was  born  under  fire,  with  revolts  immediately  coming  into 
conflict with monarchies.  It was a context in which military strength was critical.  The 
emphasis  on  national  strength  fed  pro-natalist  thinking.   More  people  meant  more 
soldiers, farmers, and workers.  After World War I, French pro-natalists took dead aim at 
“neo-Malthusians” for undermining France.23  Prominent among European nationalists 
was French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte who saw women's raison d'être as producing 
and raising children for the Empire.24  The Napoleonic Code, instituted across much of 
France's  European  empire,  reflected  this  view  of  the  sexes.   Revolutionary  France 
expanded the government into new roles of education and science.  Demography became 
a political issue in France, not just an academic one.  The French government has since 
concerned itself with demography, nearly always with a pro-growth stance.25
Many contrasts  can  be  drawn between  Malthusian  and  nationalist  pro-natalist 
thinking.   Malthus  was  looking  at  the  “big  picture”,  the  fate  of  human  civilization. 
Bonaparte and other nationalists concerned themselves with the survival and prosperity 
22 Ibid. Also Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Published 1867. PP. 334.
23 Richard Tomlinson, “The Disappearance of France, 1896-1940: French Politics and the Birth Rate” The 
Historical Journal 28, 2 (1985): 411, accessed March 3, 2011, doi: 10.1017/S0018246X00003198
24 Jane K. Burton. Napoleon and the Woman Question. Lubbock: Texas Tech UP, 2007. P. 177.
25 Leslie King. France Needs Children. Sociological Quarterly 39.1 (1998): 33-52.  Also Magnus, George. 
The Age of Aging. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons (Asia): 2009. P. 17.
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of the nation-state.  Malthus thought individuals, acting morally and out of economic 
self-interest, were the best regulators of fertility, whereas the nationalists tended to use 
ideology and government policies to encourage having children.
Nationalism took extreme form in fascism in the first half of the 20th century, and 
with it  emerged radical pro-natalist  ideas intertwined with pseudo-scientific views on 
race.  Fascist leaders Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini encouraged German and Italian 
families to have large families in order to strengthen their own nations and promote a 
“master  race.”26  Nazi  Germany notoriously  mandated  sterilization  and  death  for  the 
mentally ill, Jews, Gypsies, Slavs, and other  “undesirables.”
We have seen four distinct views on population growth in the West that I call the 
First Era of Modern Demography.  First was the religious view that life was glorious and 
procreation a divine mandate.  Having children was not a means to an end, it was the end. 
Most  of human civilization has existed in  a  time of very slow population growth so 
having many children was necessary for survival.  Then came Malthus with an economic-
humanitarian  critique  of  the  “principle  of  population.”   He  feared  if  people  did  not 
practice self-restraint, the world would overpopulate.  Marxists disagreed because since 
they saw labor as the major determinant of wealth, more people meant more labor meant 
more wealth.  European nationalists also preferred population growth, seeing people as a 
military  and  economic  asset  rather  than  a  burden.   Taken  to  the  fascist  extreme, 
demography became a racial objective.
Fears of population growth receded in the late 19th and first of the 20th century. 
World Wars I and II wiped out so much of the West's population that in the post-war 
years governments promoted large families and immigration.  Rising prosperity during 
26 Magnus, 16.
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this era, punctuated by wars and depression, mocked Malthus' predictions of decline.27 
But rapid population growth in the under-developed world brought  Malthus'  thinking 
back into the mainstream of academia and policy-making.
2.4 SECOND ERA OF MODERN DEMOGRAPHY
Paul Ehrlich's The Population Bomb, published in 1968, started the Second Era of 
Modern Demography.  Ehrlich predicted massive devastation to the world's poor nations 
if their populations continued growing faster than food production.28  Unlike Malthus, he 
had the benefit of better statistics, evolutionary knowledge, and news of what was going 
on around the globe.  Writing for a popular audience, he describes in vivid detail slums, 
famines, and environmental degradation in the under-developed world.29  Ehrlich was an 
American biologist in the field of ecology, an area that studies the interactions between 
organisms and their environment.  His focus on global ecology and environment using 
modern scientific methods, rather than ideology, distinguishes the Second Era from the 
First.
Ehrlich  argued  the  foundation  of  over-population  is  that  people  want  large 
families but large families have negative externalities.  He suspected people want large 
families out of egoism and the sexual pleasure of childbearing.30  Ehrlich called family 
planning through birth control a total failure in the developing world.31  To achieve his 
27 Magnus, 15.
28 Paul R. Ehrlich. The Population Bomb. New York: Ballantine, 1968.
29 Labels for poor countries keep changing.  During the Cold War, the Third World referred to the non-
aligned nations of Africa, Middle East, etc., with the First World being the developed West and Second 
World being Communist nations.  Third World later came to mean poor but fell out of style with the end of 
the Cold War.  Since then, terms like “pre-industrial” and “undeveloped” imply timeless societies, while 
“developing” sometimes gives the false impression of progress.  This report uses “under-developed” and 
“developed” to distinguish advanced economies from developing economies.  But language is always on 
the move so no doubt these terms will sound old-fashioned one day.
30 Ehrlich, 83, 141.
31 Ibid., 81-94.
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goal  of  zero or  negative  population growth,  Ehrlich suggested higher  taxes  for  large 
families, taxes on baby goods, and subsidizing sterilization, abortion, and adoption.  Sex 
education would teach that sex need not be for reproduction.  Finally, Ehrlich saw raising 
a large family a “plush lifestyle...being supported in part by more responsible members of 
society.”32  The idea that raising multiple children is an easy lifestyle is an unusual one.
The  Population  Bomb was  a  best  seller  in  1968  America.   It  galvanized 
environmentalists and humanitarians around the common cause of population control. 
The  book  seemed  to  confirm  Malthus'  prediction  that  rapid  population  growth  was 
causing misery among the world's poor.  Its tone was alarmist, urging policy makers to do 
something immediately or be doomed.  Subsequent debate led to the emergence of a bloc 
of academics, NGOs, and policy-makers who said population control was needed to save 
the  environment  and  alleviate  poverty.   Studies  by  the  U.S.  National  Academy  of 
Sciences in 1971 and UN in 1973 said population growth was bad.33
One critic of  The Population Bomb was economist Julian Lincoln Simon who 
wrote The Ultimate Resource in 1981 to argue population growth was good!34  He rebuts 
Ehrlich's running-out-of-resources argument by saying increasing resource scarcity raises 
the price, making it more lucrative for resource extractors who innovate and invest to 
raise production.  Higher prices also encourage conservation.  The ultimate resource was 
the human mind which could adapt and innovate in the face of changing circumstances. 
Simon  drew  on  the  research  of  Danish  economist  Ester  Boserup  who  showed  that 
historical population pressures determined land use and agricultural innovation, rather 
than agriculture limiting population.35  
32 Ibid., 131
33 David E. Bloom, David Canning, Jaypee Sevilla. The Demographic Dividend:A New Perspective on the  
Economic Consequences of Population Change. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003. P. 3
34 Julian L. Simon. The Ultimate Resource. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1981.
35 Ibid., 376-377.
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Adding  to  Boserup's  thesis  that  population  pressures  were  the  mother  of 
innovation,  Simon plotted scientific  discoveries in  Ancient  Greek and Roman history 
against population growth.36  Comparing a nation against itself over time eliminated some 
of the cultural and political differences that affect scientific discovery.  He found there 
was a positive correlation between population growth and more scientific discoveries. 
Population growth not only incentivized ancient Greeks and Romans to innovate, but 
more brains at work made more discoveries. 
As a free-market economist, Simon believed strongly in the rational individual 
who,  given  the  necessary  information  and  freedom  to  choose,  would  make  fertility 
decisions that  were best for them and their  family.   He did not advocate pro-natalist 
policies.
Economist Simon Kuznets also defended population growth.  Writing in 1960, 
Kuznets said that since the end of the 18th century, there has been no period of time when 
a  country's  population  grew  and  per-capita  income  dropped.37  Short  declines  in 
productivity  and  per-capita  income  came  from crop  failures  and  cyclical  recessions. 
Kuznets  argued that  larger  populations  had more  brains  and potential  for  innovation 
which enabled more specialization in research.   A hundred scientists  can delve more 
deeply  into  distinct  fields  than  ten  scientists.   The  former  has  more  potential  for 
collaboration.   So too goes the economy.  A closed-economy with a population of a 
thousand  can  specialize  more  than  an  economy  with  a  population  of  a  hundred. 
Specialization is economically efficient because it allows a person to become an expert in 
one area, rather than merely good in many.  Larger populations benefit from economies 
36 Ibid. 378-379.
37 Simon Kuznets. “Population Change and Aggregate Output” in Demographic and Economic Change in  
Developed Countries. Princeton: Princeton UP: 1960: 324-351. P. 324. 
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of scale and shared knowledge more rapidly.38  Kuznets cited John Maynard Keynes as 
demonstrating that a growing labor force has greater mobility than a stagnant one.39
Kuznets drew an important distinction between population growth as a result of 
immigration  or  natural  increase  (the  difference  between  birth  rate  and  death  rate). 
Another wrinkle is internal migration.  While the American experience was unique in that 
immigrants often arrived in urban areas then moved to rural areas on the frontier, most 
later  settled in urban areas,  and were joined by American migrants from rural  areas. 
Rural areas tended to have higher rates of natural growth while urban areas tended to 
have higher rates of immigration-driven growth.  Kuznets thought this was a beneficial 
system that indicated high labor mobility, essential for a modern economy.40
Kuznets  spent  considerable  time debunking the  idea  that  higher  fertility  rates 
reduces capital accumulation (the savings rate).  He argues families tend to cannibalize 
their own consumption and leisure budgets to pay for children instead of reducing their 
savings rate.  Children provide their parents an incentive to work more.  On the issue of 
capital accumulation, he notes that, all things equal, if the population were stable, the rate 
at which retired people would divest would be equal to the rate people invest, yielding 
zero  net  aggregate  savings.   Population  growth,  on  the  other  hand,  would  lead  to  a 
continual surplus in aggregate savings.41  This is a complex problem when considering 
the age structure of a population,  changing economic conditions,  and participation of 
foreign investors but the principle on its own is sound.
It  is  interesting  that  as  early  as  1960,  Kuznets  felt  professional  and  popular 






resource exhaustion, hurt societal organization, and reduced capital accumulation.  This 
was eight years before Ehrlich published The Population Bomb.  The Population Bomb, 
therefore, was possibly just an exclamation point to an already large body of literature 
critiquing population growth.
Since the 1980s, another school of thought has emerged to de-emphasize the role 
population growth plays in the economy.  The “neutralist” view emerged primarily in 
opposition to the Malthus-Ehrlich catastrophism arguments to say population growth was 
not  an impediment to  economic  growth.42  But  the neutralist  view does not  promote 
population  growth  either.   Other  factors  like  monetary  policy,  trade  policy,  and  the 
education system were seen as more important has just slowing population growth.  A 
2003 report published by the RAND Corporation argued this “neutralist” view has been 
the  dominant  view  among  researchers  since  the  mid-1980s,  and  that  demographic 
research has moved on to focus on the age structure of a population.43  In developed 
nations, the age structure of their population is becoming a major policy issue this report 
addresses.  In my view, the adoption of a neutralist view toward population will prove a 
transitory stage as advanced economies see the intrinsic benefits of population growth.
2.5 THE DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND
Academics and policy-makers in the 1960s and 70s were increasingly concerned 
with the idea of Third World development.  European empires were receding and leaving 
behind new nation-states  whose  governments  shouldered  the  burden of  developing  a 
national  identity,  diverse  economy,  improving  health  and  well-being,  maintaining 
security, and retaining a level of international independence befitting a sovereign state. 
42 Bloom, et. al., 7-20.
43 Ibid.
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Perceived vulnerability to Communism and Western guilt over their role in post-colonial 
states' under-development attracted the attention of social scientists to the development 
problem.  Development economics remains a inter-disciplinary field with all branches of 
academia  contributing  ideas.   Ideas  include  a  free  market  economy,  an  independent 
judiciary,  public  works,  and  others.   All  are  true  to  some extent  but  the  relative  of 
importance of each is hotly debated.
Demographers' contribution to the debate was the idea that reducing fertility helps 
development—the demographic dividend.44  It  is undoubtedly the most important 20th 
century demographic  idea for  policy-makers.   A consensus  on the  the importance  of 
reducing  fertility  in  developing  countries  emerged  from  the  1984  UN  International 
Conference on Population.45 The demographic dividend refers to three alleged effects of 
reduced fertility.  First, with fewer children parents can concentrate health and education 
expenditures.  “Quality” of children is supposed to trump quantity.  Second, having fewer 
children allows greater female participation in the workforce because women who might 
otherwise spend their time parenting can work.
Third, the demographic dividend temporarily reduces the dependency ratio.  The 
bulge of working age population increases per-capita income simply because more of the 
population is working.46  Children are a short-term drain on resources in two ways: the 
food, clothing, and services they consume, and the opportunity cost parents pay to raise 
their children.  Even in situations where both parents work, women tend to earn less than 
men for the same work done, partly because employers factor in the risk that women may 
become pregnant and take maternity leave.
44 Ronald Lee, and Andrew Mason. “What Is the Demographic Dividend?” Finance and Development 43.3 
(2006). International Monetary Fund.
45 Massimo Livi-Bacci. A Concise History of World Population. 3rd ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001. P. 
167-171.
46 Bloom, et. al,  xi.
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The  bulge  in  working-age  population  lasts  about  fifty  years.47  As  the  bulge 
retires, developed countries face a demographic “anti-dividend” as they stop producing. 
Some of have argued that a second demographic dividend emerges out of the first as the 
bulge  saves  for  old  age.   The  increased  capital  accumulation  yields  continued  and 
sustainable economic development regardless of the age structure of population.48
Without using the term demographic dividend, Simon and Kuznets both critiqued 
its  assumptions.   Simon  criticized  the  theory  that  population  growth  is  bad  for 
development by saying global per capita income, living standards, life expectancy, and 
every other quality of life metric have rapidly increased in the last two hundred years as 
human  population  also  rapidly  increased.   If  rapid  population  growth  hurts  human 
development, then the United States, Western Europe, and Japan should be basket cases 
today.  Even if one does not agree that population growth is good for long-term growth in 
the  standard  of  living,  they  have to  acknowledge  that  population  is  not  so  great  an 
impediment  because  of  the  empirical  record  of  population  growth  and  economic 
development occurring together for long periods of time.
Kuznets anticipated the second demographic dividend which predicts increased 
capital accumulation by saying as the elderly retire, they are forced to pull capital out of 
the market to fund their retirement.  An imbalance between a small young population 
investing, and a large old population divesting will decrease overall capital.
Western old age support  systems also reduce the need to  save for retirement. 
Taxes on the working class are immediately transferred to the elderly through defined 
pension and health benefits.  People know what kind of benefits to expect in retirement 
and save accordingly.




The problem with theoretical models of population growth is they often assume a 
closed system.  Kuznets' model of capital accumulation is only valid if there is no foreign 
investment.   Selling pressures from a large  elderly population will  drive asset  prices 
down unless the buyers include foreign investors.
Pre-industrial societies valued high fertility as an economic necessity.  Economic 
activity was labor intensive and children the only source of support for parents in old age. 
Population growth rates remained low because of high mortality rates.  Technological 
advancements  from  the  Industrial  Revolution  sharply  reduced  mortality  rates  while 
fertility rates declined more slowly, leading to a population boom.  Thomas Malthus saw 
this trend around the turn of the 19th century and predicted catastrophe for the world's 
working classes as population growth outpaced food production.  He advocated “moral 
self-restraint” among people to delay marriage and have only as many kids as they could 
support.   Radicals attacked him on both sides,  some calling for coercive sterilization 
programs and Marxists accusing him of trying to keep the working classes weak.  
Marxists and nationalists favored population growth because they saw people as 
assets  rather  than  burdens.   Since  Marxism believed  people  created  labor  and  labor 
created  wealth,  more  people  created  more  wealth.   The  nationalists  thought  more 
narrowly, looking at the economic and military advantage a larger population brings a 
country.  Fascists took demography to the racial extreme, promoting population growth 
for desired ethnicities and “ethnic cleansing” for the undesirables.
Environmentalism and economic development emerged as research priorities in 
the post-World War II world.  Both promoted anti-natalist policies for different reasons. 
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Paul  Ehrlich  argued  in  1968 that  the  world's  population  would  overwhelm available 
natural resources and cause famine and poverty.  The birth of the demographic dividend 
was  an  economic  approach  to  demography  and  Third  World  development.   Several 
economists including Simon Kuznets and Julian Simon pushed back against anti-natalism 
to say population growth did not hurt standards of livings and might even be beneficial.
Among demographers,  Malthus and Ehrlich's  arguments have been thoroughly 
discredited.   Researchers  no  longer  fear  population  growth  but  still  promote  lower 
fertility  rates  in  under-developed  countries  as  key  to  the  demographic  dividend. 
Population policy research has diverged into two areas: what is good for under-developed 
nations, and what is good for developed nations.  In developed countries, researchers are 
increasingly concerned with the inevitable result of a sharp decline in fertility—aging. 
They  discuss  many  coping  policies  including,  gradually,  the  adoption  of  pro-natalist 
policies.
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Chapter 3: Comparative Population Policy
3.1 OVERVIEW
Demographers  have  divided  their  work  into  recommendations  for  under-
developed and developed nations.  They generally recommend anti-natalist policies to 
under-developed  nations  to  speed  development  and  mildly  pro-natalist  or  pro-
immigration policies to mitigate the consequences of aging for the developed nations. 
This report focuses on the population policies of developed nations as they grapple with 
near zero natural population growth, fertility rates below replacement, and rapidly aging 
populations.  This section looks at four countries representing a cross-section of policies 
in this area: Singapore, the United States, France, and Japan.
3.2 SINGAPORE
3.2.1 Background
Singapore is a multi-ethnic city-state just north of the Equator in Southeast Asia. 
Founded as a British trading hub and entrepôt for China—Europe trade routes, the island 
attracted a thriving commercial class of Chinese, Malays, Tamils, Persians, Indonesians, 
and Europeans.  The island's population has grown from 150 in 1819 to five million in 
2010.49  With no natural resources beyond its strategic location and natural harbor, trade 
was essential.  The city was built on international trade and immigration, characteristics 
that influence its population policies today.
A siege mentality grew out of Singapore's experience in the 1960s and 70s.  The 
British Empire granted Singapore independence in 1963, joined Malaysia the same year, 
49 Mui T. Yap. “Fertility and Population Policy: The Singapore Experience.” Journal of Population and 
Social Security 1 (2002): 643-58. P. 644.
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but  separated  in  1965.   A  fierce  political  battle  between  the  PAP  and  Malaysia's 
government  over  the  participation  of  ethnic  Chinese  in  government  led  to  Malaysia 
expelling Singapore in 1965 because Malaysia was afraid Chinese-majority Singapore 
would cause problems for Malay-dominated Malaysia.  The separation personally hurt 
Singapore's long-serving Prime Minster Lee Kwan Yew.
Adding to Singapore's foreign relations fears, anti-Chinese riots in Malaysia and 
Indonesia well into the 1990s kept the country on edge.  Communist victories in Vietnam, 
Laos, and Cambodia unnerved Singapore and created refugee problems.  In the 2000s, 
fears  of  Islamic  terrorism  kept  the  siege  mentality  alive  even  though  Singapore  is 
arguably more secure now than it has ever been.
  Since independence the country has been a one-party state.  The People's Action 
Party (PAP), whose name belies it leftist roots, dominates politics with a technocratic 
governance style.  As of 2011, the PAP controls 82 of 84 elected seats in Parliament. 
Singapore  has  been the  “developmental  state”  described by Chalmers  Johnson.   The 
developmental state is where a strong central government guides economic development 
through an efficient, technocratic bureaucracy.50  The developmental state differs from 
Marxist policies in that the means of production remain in private hands and international 
competitiveness  is  cultivated.51  Singapore's  government  has  had  no  qualms  steering 
society  towards  development  goals  using  the  education  system,  housing  policy, 
conscription (known as National Service or NS), state-owned companies, and population 
policy.
50 Chalmers Johnson. MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975. 
Stanford UP, 1982. P. 19-24.
51 Ibid.
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Table 3 shows Singapore in 2011 has a bulge in the 30-60 year old population. 
The  left  pyramid  shows  the  classic  demographic  dividend,  a  bulge  of  working  age 
population that temporarily lowers the dependency ratio.   The right pyramid includes 
natural growth, immigration, and guest worker projections.52
3.2.2 Old age support system
The  primary  social  welfare  system  is  the  Central  Provident  Fund  (CPF),  a 
compulsory savings account that can be used for home purchases, medical expenses, and 
retirement.53  Employee and employer contributions are mandatory, with most workers 
contributing 36 percent of their pay-check—20 percent paid by employees and 16 percent 
paid  by  employers  as  of  2006.   Mandatory  contributions  and  withdrawals  are  tax-
52 As stated in footnote 11, the 2030 projections are inaccurate because they assume the large number of 
foreign workers is only temporary, according to an email from the Census' Chief of Population Studies 
Branch.  Given the long-standing pro-immigrant policy of Singapore, and long-term increases in foreigners 
as a share of total population, this is an unreasonable assumption, and the Census Chief agreed.  He said to 
expect new projections that factor in the growth in foreigners in 2011.
53 “Singapore.” Pension Funds Online. Allianz Global Investors.  Accessed January 29, 2011.
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Table 3: Age structure of Singapore: 2011 - 2030
exempt.54  Savings are managed individually through government-approved investment 
options.   CPF  accounts  are  individual  accounts  with  no  risk  sharing  or  income 
distribution across the population.  The only government benefit is the tax exemption and 
mandatory employer contributions.  The government does not provide universal health 
care.
These characteristics make Singapore's  pension system different from Western 
pensions which rely on taxes on the working age population.  Singapore's pension system 
is resistant to the demographic dangers of the rest of the developed world, but exposes the 
individual to more risk and is less equitable in dispensing benefits.  The CPF is known as  
a  “defined  contribution”  plan  because  there  is  known  contribution  and  an  unknown 
benefit.  The benefits are the result of the performance of investments and pace at which 
the owner withdraws their savings.
Supplementing  the  CPF  are  MediShield,  MediFund,  Eldercare  Fund,  and 
ElderShield.  MediShield is an optional government-run, subsidized health insurance plan 
intended for catastrophic illnesses.55  It is only offered up to age 85.  MediFund assists 
low-income patients.  The Eldercare programs are a recent addition to Singapore's old age 
support  system.   Eldercare  provides  grants  to  charities  that  serve  the  elderly  and  is 
expected to distribute $1.8 billion in 2010.56  Eldershield is an optional insurance plan to 
cover long-term care.  Benefits are capped at $283 a month in 2010 for 72 months.57
54 Ibid.
55 Meng-Kin Lim, "Health Care Reforms in Singapore" Ed. Kieke G. H. Okma. Six Countries, Six Reform 
Models: the Healthcare Reform Experience of Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore,  
Switzerland and Taiwan : Healthcare Reforms "under the Radar Screen" Hackensack, NJ: World 





Singapore's  population  policy  is  shaped  by  the  country's  three  fundamental 
characteristics: multi-ethnic tradition, siege mentality, and constant thirst for economic 
development.  The country's population policies are typical of the developed countries: 
anti-natalist  policies from 1949 to 1984 to reduce population growth and raise living 
standards, followed by a reversal into pro-natalist policies from 1984 to the present when 
the total  fertility  rate (TFR) fell  below replacement in  1977.58  Like other developed 
nations  profiled  in  this  report,  the  pro-natalist  policies  have been largely  ineffective, 
forcing Singapore to accept more immigrants.  Unlike some of the other nations profiled, 
Singapore has experienced few problems integrating immigrants into society.
Figure 6 shows Singapore's rapid decline in fertility rates interrupted only by a 
short-lived boom in the late 1980s.  The island's population grew at an annual rate of 
58 Swee-Hock Saw. Population Policies and Programmes in Singapore. Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies.
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Figure 6: Singapore fertility rates: 1960 - 2008
about  five  percent  in  the  post-World  War  II  years  from  a  high  fertility  rate  and 
immigration inflow, putting pressure on the housing and education infrastructure.59  The 
British colonial government's Social Welfare Department was running food centers for 
children.60  In response to perceived overcrowding  and the growing trend worldwide of 
anti-natalist thinking, concerned residents established the Family Planning Association 
(FPA)  in  1949  to  educate  and  advocate  to  couples  on  family  planning  techniques.61 
Sustained annual increases in the number of visits to FPA clinics show strong demand for 
family planning in the 1950s and 60s.  In 1950, there were 1,871 visits to the clinics.  By 
1965 the number had risen to 27,054 visits, the majority of which were women returning 
to re-supply oral contraceptives that came on to the market in 1961.62  The government 
supported it with increasingly large grants from 1949 to 1958, then declining grants from 
1959  to  1968  when  government  support  ended  as  the  newly  sovereign  Singaporean 
government took the lead in promoting family planning.63
In  1966,  the  government  established  the  Singapore  Family  Planning  and 
Population Board (SFPPB) with the same objectives as the FPA but with an eye to social  
and  economic  development  rather  than  humanitarianism.64  The  SFPPB  had  more 
resources  and  staff  than  the  FPA,  a  more  professional  organization,  and  as  a 
governmental entity more power.  From 1968 to 1977, several trends in family planning 
emerged.  One was that the women seeking birth control were increasingly younger and 








rather  than  being  unable  to  financially  support  them.65  These  trends  reflected  the 
increasing prosperity and education in Singapore.
Singapore legalized abortion with the approval of a social welfare board in 1970.66 
In  the  preceding  debate,  the  Minister  of  Health  argued  that  the  government  should 
provide a back-up plan for contraceptives it provided.67  If the government was going to 
aggressively promote family planning and provide contraceptives that later failed, and 
then forbid abortions, women would feel betrayed.  Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew saw 
abortion as another birth control tool to limit children a couple could not afford.68  He saw 
family planning as part of national development in raising the “quality” of the population.
In addition to state-encouraged family planning, Singapore's anti-natalist policies 
included punishing large  families  with lower  priority  public  housing and education.69 
Families can register for new public housing flats and choose their primary school with 
smaller  families  getting  preference.   Over  80  percent  of  Singaporeans  live  in  public 
housing so these were significant disincentives to having children especially since larger 
living space is crucial to having more children.70
Fertility rates fell from five in 1965 to two in 1975.  By 1977, Singapore's TFR 
fell  below replacement,  meaning without  a net  inflow of immigrants  or  a  rise  in  the 
fertility rate, the population would decrease in the long-run.71  The government began to 









better educated parents to “ensure that the next generation will not be too depleted of the 
talented.”72  Lee was concerned about the demographic-economic paradox.
The  government  saw  a  problem  when  educated  women  were  having  fewer 
children than less-educated women.  Lee worried the education system could only do so 
much and that  good parenting was crucial to the success of Singapore.  The implication 
was that educated parents raised better children.  This is a untenable policy position in 
many countries so much be considered part of the unique Singapore context.
Singapore introduced a host of pro-natalist policies targeted at educated women in 
1984.  Children of mothers with a university degree or professional qualifications got 
priority in registering for primary school.73  The Education Minister saw it as largely 
ineffective and unpopular and shut it down after one year.  Educated women received up 
to S$10,000 for each child up to three.  The incentive was based on a percentage of the 
woman's  income to  account  for  the  opportunity cost  in  taking time away from their 
career.  The government also set up the Social Development Unit (SDU) to help single, 
college graduate government employees find partners.
Anti-natalist policies targeted low-income, low-educated families.  Women from 
these groups got S$10,000 for getting sterilized before age 30 if they had no more than 
two  children.   Government  hospitals  standardized  their  delivery  fees  across  all 
neighborhoods, effectively raising childbirth costs for poorer families.
The government introduced further incentives in 1987 and 2001.  Singaporeans 
could use their CPF accounts to pay for hospital fees for the third child.  Public housing 




and  abortion  for  all  demographics,  and  gave  cash  incentives  to  low-income,  low-
education families for birth control rather than sterilization.74
In 2000, Prime Minister  Goh Chok Tong warned of the inevitable population 
decline if TFR stayed at 1.48, well below replacement of 2.1, and no immigrants were 
accepted.  He said immigrants were not a substitute for Singaporeans, implying there was 
a  unique  Singaporean  culture  that  was  passed  down  through  parents  rather  than  the 
education system or society.  He called for a “total environment conducive to raising a 
family.”  
The new Child Development Co-Savings Scheme gave large financial incentives 
to families for their second and third child.  Families received S$500 per year for six 
years for the second child, and S$1,000 per year for six years for the third child.  The 
program also created a Child Development Account that could be used to pay for child 
care and kindergartens, funded by the parents' contributions up to S$1,000 per year for 
the second birth and S$2,000 per year for the third birth, which would be matched 1:1 by 
the government.   The children had to be Singaporean citizens and not adopted.   The 
government started reimbursing employers for eight weeks of paid maternity leave for the 
third child.
The government  began pushing family-friendly policies  within the  public  and 
private sectors, including paternity leaves, childcare subsidies, deferred down payments 
on public housing in order to get young couples into their own flat quickly, and pro-
family  focus  in  the  education  system.   Singapore's  three  universities  built  more  on-
campus housing, subsidizing the fees in order to encourage Singaporean students to get 




Singapore's pro-natalist policies are a reversal from the 1950s – 70s when the 
government discouraged children.  Children back then were seen as a resource burden 
rather than a national asset and investment.  The first pro-natalist policies in the 1980s 
focused  on  compensating  for  the  economic  burden  of  child-rearing.   By  2000,  the 
government recognized that social trends were also to blame for the falling fertility rate. 
Young couples no longer tolerated living with multiple generations under the same roof. 
They delayed marriage and children until  they could move into their  own apartment. 
Young women's expectation of a career equal to men put a huge financial opportunity 
cost on having children.  And with modern financial systems, an individual could save for 
their own retirement rather than rely on their children.
From 1980-1984, the TFR averaged 1.68.  From 1985-1990, the TFR averaged 
1.71, a gain of 1.75 percent.  But those numbers are skewed by an extraordinarily fertile 
year in 1988 because double 8s are positive symbols in Chinese culture.  After peaking in 
1988,  TFR  continued  its  slide  downwards  and  show  no  increase  from  the  2001 
incentives.  In 2008, TFR was 1.28, the third lowest in the world (after Hong Kong and 
South Korea).
3.2.4 Immigration policies
The other half to population policy is immigration.  Immigrants have been central 
to Singapore's culture since its establishment as a British trading colony in 1819 in which 
free immigration was the law.76  The British finally restricted the inflow in 1928 but 
immigrants continued to account for the majority of population growth until World War 
II.   Since independence in 1965 the government has maintained comparatively liberal 
76 Brenda S.A. Yeoh. Singapore: Hungry for Foreign Workers at All Skill Levels. Migration Information 
Source: Jan. 2007.
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immigration policies that make it easy for foreigners to work in Singapore.  Singapore 
has three categories of residency: citizens, permanent residents (PRs), and non-residents. 
PRs are foreigners who enjoy all the benefits as citizens and must serve in the military,  
but  cannot  vote.   Non-residents  are  international  students  and  guest  workers.   At 
independence in 1965, there were 58,000 non-residents on the island, about 2.9 percent of 
the population.77  By 1980 there were 131,800 non-residents comprising 5.5 percent of 
the total  population,  and by 2010 there were 1.3 million non-residents comprising an 
incredible 25.7 percent of the total population (see Figure 7).78  Since 1980, non-resident 
immigration has accounted for 44 percent of Singapore's population growth.
Immigration policies tightened in the 1960s after independence because of strong 
natural growth and the need to establish a Singaporean identity.  But decades of strong 
77 Ibid.
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Figure 7: Singapore population characteristics: 1980 - 2010
economic growth and an advancing economy created demand for foreign workers of all 
skills  levels.   Job growth outpaced the natural  population  growth,  and the  education 
system could not train workers to fill every niche in the economy.  Foreigners arrived as 
construction  workers,  maids,  hospitality  workers,  managers,  analysts,  engineers,  and 
nurses.  Today there are dedicated guest worker visas for various levels of income and 
education.  The government also wants to double the number of international students 
from 66,000 in 2005 to 150,000 in 2012.79  International students are eligible for a tuition 
grant subsidized their education if they agree to work in Singapore for three years after 
graduation.  In practice, Singapore gets a lot longer than three years out of grantees.  As 
PRs they can bring their family to Singapore, will be three years into a career, and seven 
years into the Singapore experience.
The  government  still  maintains  tight  controls  on  who  becomes  a  citizen. 
Citizenship is granted by birth in Singapore only if one parent is a Singaporean.  The 
same goes for children born outside the country.
On  balance  Singapore  has  integrated  the  swelling  immigrant  population  well 
because of  its  history.   Singaporean identity  was never  tied up in  a  single ethnicity. 
Ethnic violence is unheard of, in part because the government keeps a tight lid on free 
speech. Reporters Without Borders ranks Singapore 136th out of 178 countries for press 
freedom in 2010, behind even Iraq.80  The government is especially watchful for any 
speech it claims will incite violence.  Opposition leaders have been sued into bankruptcy 
through libel laws when they criticized government leaders.  Public demonstrations are 
forbidden everywhere except one park.  It is hard to gauge the true degree of Singaporean 
acceptance of  immigration policy in a one-party state that dominates public discourse. 
79 Yeoh, 2007.
80 Reporters Without Borders, Press Freedom Index, 2010.
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One advantage of having 25 percent of the population with only temporary residency 
permits is the government can deport them if they cause trouble or cannot find a job. 
Unemployment in December 2010 was an envious 2.2 percent, compared to the United 
States' 9 percent in Jan. 2011.81
In the last few years, the government has hinted that it was scaling back its liberal 
guest worker policies.  A high level commission called for fewer foreign workers in 2010 
because open door  policies took the focus off  improving Singaporeans'  skills.82  The 
commission also noted domestic discontent about foreigners depressing wages.  Later 
that year, the government tightened immigration policies.  But Wong Kan Seng, Minister 
for Home Affairs, reminded Singaporeans that this was not a fundamental shift in attitude 
toward immigration: “Unless there is a significant shift in attitudes towards marriage and 
parenthood, and we see improved birth rates, we will continue to need immigrants for 
Singapore to remain a vibrant and competitive economy.”83
3.2.5 Conclusion
Singapore's population policies offer lessons to other developed nations struggling 
with an aging citizenry.  Fertility incentives have failed but immigration and guest worker 
programs have enabled strong economic growth.  Singapore benefits from a history of 
immigration and multi-ethnic culture that works well with foreigners.  A strong central 
government  and  island  geography  create  strong  borders  that  prevent  unwanted 
immigration.  An important question is how Singaporeans truly feel about immigration, a 
81 Singapore Department of Statistics, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics website.  Accessed January 20, 
2011.
82 Alex Kennedy. “Singapore Mulls New Limits on Foreign Workers.” Jakarta Globe. Feb. 1, 2010.
83 “Singapore Raises the Bar on PR for Million Dollar Investors.” Guide Me Singapore.com. Oct. 5, 2010.
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question that can only be answered in an open civil society.  But the economic benefits of 
liberal immigration and guest worker policies are unambiguous.
3.3 UNITED STATES
3.3.1 Background
As the largest economy and third most populous nation, and ninth richest nation 
per capita in the world, the United States' population policies are an essential part of this 
report.  The U.S. is in the population neutralist camp with no official population policy. 
It has the third highest fertility rate in the OECD after Israel and Turkey.  TFR was 3.7 in  
1960 at the height of the post-World War II Baby Boom when the United States saw 
rapid  economic  expansion  and  families  had  children  they  delayed  during  the  war. 
Fertility rates fell rapidly from 3.7 in 1960 to 1.7 in 1976, following a trend across the 
developed  world  with  increased  access  to  family  planning  and  abortion,  and  greater 
female attendance of college.
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But the 1980s saw a rise in fertility rates unprecedented in the developed world 
(see Figure 8).  There is no consensus as to why this occurred but the most common 
explanations are the high number of immigrants with high fertility rates,  a revival in 
religiosity, easy credit allowing home purchases, increased economic freedom, increased 
ease at which women can work and have children, and a stronger economy.84  These 
trends are mostly valid in comparing the U.S. to Western Europe as well.  No one factor 
can explain Americans' high fertility rates compared to the rest of the developed world 
because  there  are  always  counter-examples.   For  example,  economic  freedom  and 
opportunities in Singapore and Hong Kong are the highest in the world yet they have the 
lowest fertility rates in the world.
84 Rob Stein. U.S. Fertility Hits 35-Year High, Stabilizing Population. And: Tomas Frejka and Charles F. 
Weston. “Religion, Religiousness and Fertility in the US and in Europe.” European Journal of Population 
(2008).
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Figure 8: United States fertility rates: 1960 - 2008
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Immigration is an essential part of the American narrative.  School children learn 
early and often that America was founded by immigrants looking for religious freedom or 
economic opportunity.  Immigration policies have been some of the most open in the 
world since the United States' founding in 1776.  Birthright citizenship and no official 
language, religion or ethnicity helped make the United States a comparatively welcoming 
environment for immigrants.  The history of American immigration policies is one of 
alternating open and nativist periods depending on the economic and political situation. 
Nativist reactionaries have always been a player in United States immigration policy, 
frequently using violence or  racist  speech.  Their  influence in  the long-run has been 
minor, however.  Immigration has an been important driver of United States population 
growth since the first colonists arrived in the 16th century. 
High  fertility  rates  and  high  immigration  mean  U.S.  does  not  see  the  same 
demographic  storm  clouds  on  the  horizon  other  developed  nations  do,  and  the 
government  has  never  pursued  explicitly  pro-natalist  policies.   Nevertheless,  policy 
researchers have noted the demographic vulnerabilities of American pension plans for 
decades.  This is a warning to other nations is worse demographic shape: that even if high 
population growth America is facing long-term problems, other countries are in worse 
shape.
3.3.2 Old age support system
Retirement in the U.S. is assisted by various federal, state, and local, public and 
private programs, depending on one's profession.  The largest two are Social Security and 
Medicare which cover all United States citizens, except those with job-specific pensions, 
starting at age 62 for Social Security and 65 for Medicare, plus those with disabilities and 
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certain chronic diseases.  They are defined benefit plans in which benefits are relatively 
fixed.  Social Security makes cash payments to beneficiaries indexed to their lifetime 
earnings  and  an  annual  cost  of  living  adjustment  (COLA).85  In  2010,  54  million 
beneficiaries received an average annual benefit of  $12,888.86  Social Security is funded 
by a 10.4 percent  payroll  tax on the first  $106,800 as of  2011.  Employees  pay 4.2 
percent and employers pay 6.2 percent.
Medicare is a health insurance program for seniors and the disabled.  It has four 
parts: Part A is hospital insurance and covers inpatient care as well as skilled nursing 
care.   Part  B  covers  outpatient  products  and  services,  Part  C  is  subsidized  private 
insurance plans, and Part D covers prescription drugs.  In 2009, Medicare paid out an 
average of $11,743 in benefits to 46.3 million beneficiaries.87
Because  Social  Security  and  Medicare  both  rely  on  taxes  on  the  working 
population  to  fund  defined  benefits,  they  are  demographically  vulnerable.   In  2010, 
Social Security had 2.9 tax-paying workers per beneficiary, a ratio that is projected to 
shrink to 2.1 by 2035.88  There were 3.5 workers per Medicare beneficiary in 2010, and 
the Medicare Trustees Board projects it to shrink to 2.3 in 2030.  Several demographic 
trends  will  converge over  the  next  decades  to  imperil  Social  Security  and Medicare: 
increased life expectancy for those living to 65, the retirement of the post-World War II 
“Baby Boom” population, and falling fertility rates leading to fewer workers to support.  
Even worse is Medicare whose per beneficiary expenditures are projected to grow at 5.8 
percent annually from 2010 to 2019, faster than growth in inflation or GDP per capita.
85 Social Security Administration website.
86 Monthly Statistical Snapshot, SSA website.
87 Medicare Trustees Report 2010.
88 Social Security Basic Facts, SSA website.
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Medicare expenditures grew 129 percent from 2000 to 2009 while income grew 
slightly slower at 97 percent.  Prior to passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act and Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act in 2010, Medicare's funding 
formula was projected to run out in 2017.  A 2010 report from the Medicare Trustees 
Board projected insolvency would be delayed until 2029 under intermediate economic 
and demographic assumptions because the health care reform laws levy additional taxes 
on high income workers, high expense private health care plans, and theoretically slow 
the growth in Medicare expenditures.89  The Social Security Board of Trustees projects 
Social Security's funding formula will be insufficient by 2037.90
Two  other  federal  retirement  assistance  programs  are  401(k)s  and  Individual 
Retirement Accounts (IRAs).  These popular accounts are similar to Singapore's CPF 
accounts in that they are individually managed, privately-invested, tax-incentivized with 
no risk sharing among the population.  Unlike the CPF, they are voluntary.  The federal 
government gives other tax incentives for investments, such as an income tax exemption 
on interest from municipal bonds and a lower tax rate on capital gains than income.91
Some  professions  have  their  own  pension  plans  in  place  of  Social  Security. 
Federal,  state,  and  local  government  employees,  union  members,  and  private  sector 
employees often have their own defined benefit pensions.  These pensions are usually 
“final average pay” (FAP) plans that calculate the benefits based on the years worked and 
pay during the highest earning years of the beneficiary's career.  Most of these pension 
plans, along with Social Security and Medicare, have been running surpluses since their 
inception.  The surpluses are deposited into trust funds composed of equity and bond 
89 Medicare Trustees Report 2010.
90 Social Security Trustees Report 2010.
91 Michael G Meissner. About Municipal Bonds. And: Federal Capital Gains Taxes 1988 – 2011. The Tax 
Foundation.
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investments with an objective of providing enough assets to cover future retirements. 
These investments shore up the United States' various pension plans, but most projections 
have them running into fiscal trouble in a couple decades.
Table 4 shows the United States has a relatively stable age structure with each 
generation being relatively the same size.  This puts the U.S. in better shape than most 
advanced economies but not good enough to sustain its pension and health care system in 
their present forms.
3.3.3 Family policies
Arguably the first natal policies in the United States were pro-natalist policies by 
southern slave owners toward slaves.  The federal government banned the importation of 
slaves after 1807, sharply increasing slaves' values as the southern economy expanded 
and demand for slaves grew.  With this powerful economic incentive, slave owners tried 
a variety of incentives and coercive measures to encourage childbearing, including less 
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Table 4: Age structure of the United States: 2011 - 2030
fieldwork, more food, rape, and beatings.92  But research on slavery in the American 
South and British West Indies argue that slave owners were not as successful as they 
wanted in encouraging slaves to have more children.93 Women resisted with abortions, 
infanticide, prolonged breast-feeding which reduces fertility, and maternal watchfulness 
of their daughters.94  Slave owners ignorantly overworked and underfed teen-aged women 
which also reduced fertility.95  
The end of slavery following the Civil War eliminated the profit motive for child-
bearing and that era of natal policies,  from 1808 to 1865, ended.  The next wave of 
government  interest  in  child-bearing  came out  of  the  mis-application  of  evolutionary 
theory and genetics to society, a movement known as eugenics in the first half of the 20 th 
century.   Eugenics  advocated  human-directed  evolution,  that  society  should  actively 
promote  reproduction  among  desirable  people  and  prevent  reproduction  among 
undesirables,  namely  criminals,  the  poor,  and  disabled.96  Eugenicists  considered 
themselves progressives trying to move society forward using science.  Malthus' assertion 
that the lower classes were reproducing faster than the upper classes fed their urgency. 
The primary policy tool of eugenics was forced or incentivized sterilization, enacted at 
the  state  level.   The  first  was  Indiana  in  1907  and  by  1925,  twenty-five  states  had 
sterilization laws.  Over 60,000 people were sterilized under eugenic policies from 1907 
92 Deborah Gray White. Ar'n't I a woman? W.W. Norton: 1999. P. 98-104.
93 Ibid. And: B. W. Higman. Slave Populations of the British Caribbean: 1807-1834. 1995. P. 348-354. 




96 Michael G. Silver. Eugenics and Compulsory Sterilization Laws. George Washington Law Review 72.4 
(2004).
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to 1963.97  It was not until the 1960s and 70s that state governments repealed their laws, 
influenced partially by the stigma of Nazi war crimes related to sterilization.98
The  post-eugenics  era  saw  a  retreat  from  government  involvement  in  family 
planning.  Sterilization had been discredited and new birth control methods, legalized 
abortion, and changing attitudes toward sex forced governments to be accommodating in 
their policies.  Presidents Kennedy and Johnson made fighting poverty a top priority (the 
“War  on  Poverty”)  and  began  aid  to  poor  families,  with  aid  scaling  up  with  more 
children.  Two programs to come out of that era were Medicaid and the Women, Infants, 
and Children program (WIC).
Medicaid  provides  health  insurance  to  low  income  adults  with  disabilities  or 
children,  and their  children.   All  children  are covered so  total  benefits  rise  with the 
number of children a woman has.  WIC provided specialized nutritional and counseling 
support to young mothers and their children under 5.  Another significant program that 
dates back to 1935 was Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), modified in 
1996 to Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF), which provide financial assistance to 
poor families.  More children get more aid.  
The tax code also helps parents.  As of 2011 there is a $1,000 per child tax credit 
that  phases out  for wealthier families.99  The Earned Income Tax Credit  (EITC) that 
began in 1975 provides refundable tax credits (essentially cash grants) that scale up with 
the number of children low and middle-income families have.100 In 2011, poor families 
with no children can receive up to a paltry $464 tax credit but with one child that jumps 
to $3,094, and with two it can be $5,112.101  None of these policies were implemented to 
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Ten Facts about the Child Tax Credit. IRS.gov. Feb. 10, 2011.
100 Historical EITC Parameters. Tax Policy Center. Jan. 20, 2011.
101 Ibid.
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encourage more children, yet they are remarkably similar to pro-natalist policies in other 
countries.
Research on the  fertility  effects  of  these  programs is  mixed.  One 1998 study 
concluded Medicaid eligibility expansions in 1987 and 1991 yielded a 5 percent increase 
in fertility among white women but had no change on black women, while the abortion 
rate remained unchanged.102  Another 2000 study said it caused a 10 percent increase in 
fertility among beneficiaries from 1983 to 1996.103  A more recent study in 2010 says 
Medicaid's expansion had only a small positive effect on fertility in among white women 
who had not finished high school.104
The EITC proved popular in the 1990s and benefits and eligibility were expanded 
several times, providing opportunities for researchers to study its effects on fertility.  A 
2003 study found the EITC led to large increases in the number of first births, and that 
the effects were most significant in non-white families.105  The study found birth elasticity 
(the demand for children) to be highly inelastic so the overall increase in fertility rates  
was small.  That same study found that high AFDC/TANF state benefits were correlated 
with higher first birthrates.106
The United States does not have explicitly pro-natalist policies, but research by 
Joyce, et.  al.  (1998) and Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (2003) show its humanitarian 
policies for low-income parents lead to a small increase in fertility.  Opponents of aid to 
low-income families often cite this unintended consequence.  For pro-natalists in other 
102 Theodore Joyce, et al. “Is Medicaid Pronatalist? The Effect of Eligibility Expansions on Abortions and 
Births” Family Planning and Perspectives, 1998.
103 Marianne P. Bitler and Madeline Zavodny. “The Effect of Medicaid Eligibility Expansions on Births” 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta working paper. March 2000.
104 Madeline Zavodny and Marianne P. Bitler. “The Effect of Medicaid Eligibility Expansions on 
Fertility” Social Science & Medicine. 2010.
105 Reagan Baughman and Stacy Dickert-Conlin. “Did Expanding the EITC Promote Motherhood?” The 
American Economic Review 93.2 (2003).
106 Ibid.
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countries, the American experience can be seen either as an example of the limitations of 
child incentives or as an example of policies that work.
3.3.4 Immigration policies
Immigration  plays  a  central  role  in  American  history,  culture,  and  policy. 
Founded by immigrants and their descendants, nearly the entire population of the modern 
day United States are descendants of immigrants or slaves who came to North America in 
the last four hundred years.  American culture tends to be both proud of and burdened by 
this history, with periods of open immigration policies followed by reactionary periods 
when changing demographics became too unsettling.
United States immigration policy has been driven by several rationales throughout 
history.  The word  “immigration” was not used in the U.S until the 19th century; before 
that period new arrivals were called “settlers.”  The colonies and states saw population 
growth through immigration as an economic, social, and security necessity.  Larger towns 
could  support  more  specialized  economies,  rally  more  manpower  to  retaliate  against 
indigenous  attacks,  and  offered  more  marriage  prospects  to  its  members.   Colonies 
attracted immigrants with land incentives,  a system known as “indentured servitude.” 
Immigrants unable to pay the cost of their voyage to the New World up-front could agree 
to be sold as workers to large landowners in the colonies and work for a period of several  
years until freed.107  Upon being freed, the landowner would grant them a plot of land and 
supplies,  or  lump sum of  money to  start  their  own life.   Slaves  replaced indentured 
servants in the late 17th and 18th centuries as European immigration demand declined and 
slavery became more affordable.
107 Mary S. Bilder, “The Struggle of Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and Articles of Commerce” 
Missouri Law Review 61, 4 (1996) 751-752. Accessed Jan. 30, 2011.
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Immigrants  to  the  United  States  in  the  19th century  were  overwhelmingly 
European with a significant Chinese population in the West in the second half of the 
century (see Figure 9).  They came for different reasons: some fled “push” factors like 
religious  persecution,  economic  destitution,  or  political  turmoil  in  their  homelands. 
Others came for the “pull” factors of cheap land and a belief that social and economic 
opportunity were ample  in  the  U.S.108  Immigration was regulated,  however,  and the 
peaks  and  troughs  of  immigration  were  as  much  as  result  of  chancing  immigration 
policies as events in Europe.  Immigration was largely welcomed to the British colonies 
that would form the first United States but with colony-specific restrictions on the poor, 
certain religions (notably Catholics who were often considered disloyal to England), and 
blacks.109  
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Figure 9: Source of official immigration to the United States: 1820 - 2009
The United States had extremely low population densities in the 18 th and 19th 
centuries, and as it acquired more territory it felt compelled to settle the land in order to  
hold it.  Using population to seize and hold land, “settling” it, was not new but the United 
States  used  it  to  a  unprecedented  scale.   American  governments  in  the  18th and  19th 
centuries  consistently  saw  American  territory  as  empty  land  needing  settling.   The 
American  historian  Frederick  Jackson  Turner  wrote  in  1893  that  America's  unique 
frontier  experience  helped  develop  American  democratic  institutions  and  a  common 
identity across immigrant groups.110  There was policy feedback between immigration 
and territorial expansion.  Surging immigration pressured government leaders to expand 
the country, and massive territorial expansions such as the Louisiana Purchase created a 
need for more immigrants to settle the land.
Federal policy in the 1800s encouraged settlement out of a threefold desire to hold 
land  from other  countries,  to  increase  economic  prosperity  and  self-sufficiency,  and 
cultivate the ideal of the independent, hard-working “yeoman” farmer.111  If federal lands 
were distributed according to market principles, as some leaders wanted because it would 
quickly raise the most revenue, it would be auctioned off to the highest bidder.  But a 
series of federal policies culminating in the Homestead Act of 1862 increasingly favored 
squatters over the highest bidder.  The Homestead Act allowed settlers to purchase up to 
160 acres (0.65 km2) of federal land at a huge discount if they farmed and made it their 
home for five years.  Settlers had to be self-sufficient in a remote area for over a year. 
110 Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History (New York: Dover Publications, 1996). 
Print.
111 Trina W. Shanks, “The Homestead Act: A Major Asset-Building Policy in American History” in 
Inclusion in the American Dream: Assets, Poverty, and Public Policy ed. Michael Sherraden (Oxford UP, 
2005) 20-40.
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Between 1862 and 1934,  270 million acres  (1.1 million km2)  were distributed to  1.6 
million families.112
United States immigration policy in the second half of the 19th century began to 
regulate specific nationalities in order to pacify nativist  movements, especially during 
times of high unemployment.  Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans were specifically targeted 
in the late 1800s, followed by Italians, Jews, and Eastern Europeans throughout the first 
decades  of  the  1900s.113  Nativist  movements  were  born  from  economic  fears  of 
competing with immigrants for jobs, national security concerns, and “scientific racism” 
that fueled the eugenics movement described above.  The Quota Law of 1921, followed 
by the Immigration Act of 1924, set national quotas on immigrants corresponding to the 
1890 ethnic makeup of the United States.114  The idea was that that America must return 
to and maintain a specific ethnic mix.  The Great Depression in the 1930s wiped out any 
desire to take immigrants.  With small exceptions for refugees from Europe and Asia, 
immigration did not pick up during World War II  either,  with labor shortages in  the 
southwestern United States filled by Mexican migrant workers.  Racism and national 
security concerns merged when the government forced ethnic Japanese, but not Germans 
or Italians, into internment camps out of suspicion they would form an fifth column for 
Imperial Japan.





The United States accepted far more immigrations with the end of World War II. 
Between 1941 and 1945, the U.S. accepted 171,000 immigrants (see Figure 10).115  From 
1946  to  1950,  864,000  immigrants  arrived.116  Reflecting  rising  Cold  War  paranoia, 
ethnic quotas gave way to restricting foreigners with “un-American” characteristics like 
being  anarchist,  communist,  or  homosexual.117  The  period  post-war  period  saw  a 
tremendous spike in the number of immigrants forced to leave the country. From 1946 to 
1954, exit orders rose 826 percent while immigration rose 91 percent.118
Later Cold War immigration policies were less sensitive to nativist movements 
and more reflective of American foreign policy that saw residents of Communist nations 
115 “2009 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics”, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm, accessed January 20, 2011.
116 Ibid.
117 Hing, 74.
118 U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
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Annual Legal Immigration to the United States: 1820 - 2009
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Figure 10: Official immigration to the United States: 1820 - 2009
as victims.119  Communist governments in China, Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba caused mass 
emigration  to  the  United  States.   Refugees  of  American-supported  dictatorships  in 
Central  and  South  America,  on  the  other  hand,  were  often  denied  political  asylum 
because doing so would embarrass American foreign policy.120  Immigration numbers in 
the second half of the 20th century were driven steadily upwards by family unification 
policies, demand for skilled immigrants, a strong American economy, and world events 
like the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Trouble close to home in the Caribbean, Mexico, and Central America from the 
1960s onwards created the issue of illegal aliens.   Previous immigration regimes had 
never had to deal with great numbers of illegal aliens because it was physically hard to 
reach the U.S. and ports of entry tightly controlled.  Waves of immigrants crossing by 
boat, on foot, and in tractor trailers whipped up nativist furor, though it was somewhat 
blunted in the case of Cubans fleeing communism.  In the early 1980s, the southwestern 
border with Mexico was largely unenforced, and it was normal for Mexican migrants to 
cross it several times a year to work and visit family.121  Nativist anger at the lack of 
border enforcement came to a head in 1986 when President Ronald Reagen signed the 
Immigration  Control  and  Reform  Act  which  punished  employers  of  undocumented 
workers and increased enforcement.122  When illegal immigration continued unabated, 
Congress responded with 1990 Immigration Reform Act and 1996 Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant  Responsibility Act.123  Funding and manpower for the Border 
119 Michael J. McBride, “Migrants and Asylum Seekers: Policy Responses in the United States to 
Immigrants and Refugees from Central America and the Caribbean” International Migration 37, 1 (1999): 
292.
120 Ibid., 296.
121 Rob T. Guerette and Ronald V. Clarke. "Border Enforcement, Organized Crime, and Deaths of 
Smuggled Migrants on the United States – Mexico Border" European Journal on Criminal Policy and  




Patrol (BP) surged.  From 1992 to 2000, the number of BP agents along the U.S.-Mexico 
border doubled,  then doubled again from 2000 to 2008.  The number of forced exits 
surged above their early Cold War paranoia numbers (see Figure 11).
Domestic concerns reasserted themselves in immigration policy after September 
11, 2001.  National security became an obsession, and the fact that all nineteen hijackers 
were  in  the  country  legally  focused  scrutiny  on  visa  policies  rather  than  border 
enforcement.124  But economic recessions from 2001 to 2003, and 2008 to 2011 reignited 
anti-illegal immigration sentiment.  So far, the rhetoric has been directed solely at illegal 
immigration.
124“The 9/11 Commission Report”, 2004. Web: www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf , accessed 
Jan. 25, 2011.
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Annual Deportations and Voluntary Returns of Illegal Aliens: 1892 - 2009
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Figure 11: Expulsions of illegal aliens by the United States: 1892 - 2009
3.3.5 Conclusion
The United States has an unusually high fertility rate for the developed world, 
though this was not always the case.  At it lowest in the mid 1970s, the United States' 
fertility rate was as low as Western Europe's.  Then while Western Europe, Japan, and 
Singapore kept declining, the U.S. rebounded to an  incredible 2.1 in 2007.  There is no 
consensus as to why this occurred, but common explanations include the large number of 
immigrants  who  have  more  children,  birthright  citizenship  that  accommodates  even 
illegal immigrants' children, liberalized labor laws that made it easier for women to have 
children and work,  cheaper credit  to  buy a home, stronger  economy,  and a religious 
revival.
Similar to Western Europe and Japan, the United States' old age support system is 
a pay-as-you-go system that taxes the working population to pay benefits to beneficiaries. 
This makes the programs demographically vulnerable, and even with a high fertility rate 
and open immigration policies, current forecasts have Social Security and Medicare in 
fiscal trouble by 2037 and 2029, respectively.  This is sobering to other countries with 
lower fertility rates, more restrictive immigration policies, and more generous old age 
support systems.
The  United  States  long  promoted  population  growth  to  settle  its  expanding 
territory  and  develop  an  independent  economy.   Liberal  immigration  policies  drove 
population  growth  although  the  numbers  fluctuated  based  on  political  and  economic 
events in Europe.  The United States dabbled in anti-natalist eugenics policies targeted at 
“undesirable” elements of society,  and though their  cruelty was large,  their  effect  on 
overall population was small.  President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal and President 
Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society programs provided humanitarian aid to families that 
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scaled  up  with  the  number  of  children,  inadvertently  provided  a  small  pro-natalist 
incentive.
What can other nations learn from the United States' population policies?  First, 
more research is needed to understand why fertility rates recovered from 1.74 in 1976 to 
2.1  in  2007.   Is  it  really  something unique  in  American  culture,  or  are  government 
policies affecting fertility?  Second, there is strong evidence immigration is good for the 
economy and for improving fertility rates.  Immigrants and their children tend to have 
larger  families  than  “older”  American  families,  though their  fertility  rates  eventually 
regress to the mean with successive generations.
3.4 FRANCE
3.4.1 Background
France has had aggressive population growth policies for the last two centuries. 
Wracked  by  multiple  destructive  wars  since  the  French  Revolution  in  1789,  French 
governments have seen population growth as a matter of national survival.  France has 
long had strong central governments and culture that supported the government as an 
agent of social  change.  They were one of the first  governments to  develop national 
population policies.  Those policies have been characterized by a consistent pro-natalism 
supplemented with mass immigration after World Wars I and II.  France's population 
took such a hit after those wars that rebuilding the country required an immediate labor 
infusion that newborn children obviously could not provide.  Thus France accepted a 
large number of immigrants from overseas.  The collapse of French colonial territories in 
the  1950s  and  60s  more  or  less  forced  another  wave  of  immigrants  onto  France. 
Assimilation of these immigrants' descendants has been problematic.
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The French pension system, La Sécu, is similar to the American Social Security 
and Medicare systems in that benefits are financed through taxes.  This inter-generational 
transfer scheme makes it vulnerable to an aging population.  Like Social Security, tax 
revenues  earmarked  for  pensions  that  exceed  benefits  are  invested  in  a  government 
pension fund (Fonds des Réserve pour les Retraites, FRR) whose balance will be drawn 
down to  cover  deficits  in  later  years.   La Sécu is  considered  generous  by  European 
standards,  with  a  comparatively  low retirement  age  and  good  benefits.   The  French 
government has made some moves to reform it in recent years, but projections still show 
it in trouble in a couple decades.
Figure 12 shows the rebound in fertility rates from aggressive pro-natalism and a 
rise in immigrants from high fertility countries.
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France Fertility Rates: 1960 - 2008
Source: UN Population Division
Total fertility rate
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Figure 12: France fertility rates: 1960 - 2008
3.4.2 Old age support system
France's social welfare system includes a defined benefits pension system for all 
French senior citizens and universal health coverage.125  Minimum cash benefits come 
from the Guaranteed Minimum Old Age Income (Minimum Vieillese), with additional 
benefits  coming  from  government-administered,  profession-specific,  mandatory 
programs.   Régime  Général  is  the  program  covering  private  sector  employees  and 
Régimes  Spéciaux  covers  government  employees.126  Citizens  must  work 40 years  to 
qualify for a full pension, 41 starting in 2012.127  This means someone who enters the 
workforce at  age 25 must work until  age 66 to receive a full  pension.   Pensions are 
calculated as a percentage of workers' 25-year salary average and benefit increases are 
tied  to  inflation.128  Total  pension  benefits,  not  including  health  benefits,  average  70 
percent of contemporary salaries.129
125 Laura Thompson, “Pension Reform, Political Pressure, and Public Choice: The Case of France” 
Economic Affairs 28, 4 (2008): 68. Accessed March 1, 2011, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0270.2008.00874.x
126 Ibid.




Table 5: Age structure of France: 2011 - 2030
Voluntary savings plans supplement the mandatory Régimes.  Employer-provided 
savings  plans  with  company  matches  and  tax  incentives  resemble  American  401(k) 
plans.130  Employers  can  match  employee  contributions  up  to  10  percent  of  the 
beneficiary's salary tax free.131
The minimum retirement age was set at 60 from 1983 to 2010, when contentious 
reforms  will  phase  it  to  62  by  2018.132  The  government  estimates  it  needs  two 
contributing years for every benefit year in order to stay solvent.  This is a problem with 
high  unemployment,  an  aging  population,  and  increasing  life  expectancy.   France's 
median age has grown from 31.5 in 1970 to 38.9 in 2010.133  Life expectancy is projected 
to rise three years by 2020 and six years from 2040.134   In 2011, 16.75 percent of the 
population is 65 and older (see Table 5).135  By 2030, it is projected to be 22.9 percent. 
Pension benefits are projected to rise from 12 percent of GDP in 2000 to 16 percent in 
2040.136
Taxes  to  support  the  pension  system  as  some  of  the  highest  in  the  world. 
Employees pay 25-26 percent of their income (10 percent by employers, 15 percent by 
employees).137
The other half of the pension system is the National Health Insurance (NHI), a 
universal health care system covering all residents of France.138  The system is a public-
130 “France.” PensionFundsOnline. Accessed March 1, 2011.
131 Ibid.
132 Katrin Bennhold, “France Moves to Raise Minimum Age of Retirement.” The New York Times, 
September 15, 2010, accessed March 1, 2011.
133 Insee website. National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies. France.
134 Thompson, 69.
135 International Database, U.S Census Bureau website, accessed March 1, 2011.
136 Thompson, 69.
137 Shinichi E. Oka, "Pension Reform in France" The Japanese Journal of Social Security Policy 3, 1 
(2004). National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, June 2004. Web. Accessed 13 Mar. 
2011. <http://www.ipss.go.jp/webj-ad/webjournal.files/socialsecurity/2004/Jun/oka.pdf>.
138 Victor G. Rodwin, “The Health Care System Under French National Health Insurance: Lessons for 
Health Reform in the United States” American Journal of Public Health, 93, 1 (2003): 31. Accessed March 
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private hybrid based on fee-for-service government reimbursements of both public and 
private providers, with co-payments but no deductibles.  Funding comes from payroll 
taxes  of  19.7  percent,  general  revenue,  and  co-pays.139  Ninety  percent  purchase 
additional optional coverage.140  Rodwin (2003) describes NHI as more generous than 
Medicare  (prior  to  the  addition  of  Medicare  Part  D,  prescription  drug  coverage).141 
Despite  universal  coverage  and  medical  service  consumption  higher  than  the  United 
States, health care costs to government and consumer are lower.142  This is made possible 
by policies undertaken in the 1970s and 80s to limit medical inflation.  The government 
negotiated with health care employee unions to keep their rate lows, restricted the number 
of medical students and new hospitals, and higher co-pays.
In spite of France's success in holding down medical inflation for the last thirty 
years, costs continued to out-pace economic growth, forcing NHI to increasingly raid the 
government's general revenue stream.143  Low prices for medical services and prescription 
drugs  helped increase  their  use.   Physicians  protests  in  the  1990s and 2000s against 
extraordinary low salaries compared to Western Europe and the United States brought an 
increase in reimbursements.  In 2005, the French government reformed the health care 
system with more central control of health care funds, higher co-pays, higher income and 
1, 2011.
139 Victor G. Rodwin and Simone Sandier, “Health Care under French National Health Insurance: public-
private mix, low prices and high volumes” in Universal Health Insurance in France: How Sustainable? ed. 
Victor G. Rodwin. (Embassy of France, Washington, D.C., 2006) , 177. 
http://wagner.nyu.edu//health/universal.pdf, accessed March 2, 2011.
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excise taxes, and be more discerning over what drugs and services it would pay for based 
on evidence medicine.144
The NHI's financial outlook remains cloudy, in spite of the contentious reforms of 
the 2000s. France's post-World War II Baby Boom generation began retiring in 2007, 
drawing on pension funds that had previously covered NHI deficits.  An older population 
uses more medical services, and there will be fewer workers to support them.  Universal 
health care is one of France's most treasured institutions and policy objectives are framed 
in terms of solidarity,  liberalism, and pluralism.145  Strong protests have met relatively 
small changes.  More reforms will probably have to be implemented as health care costs 
continue to grow faster than revenue, and French citizens will be forced to weigh the 
alternatives  of  incentivizing  more  children  and  accepting  more  immigrants,  not  to 
mention general economic reforms to grow the economy.
3.4.3 Family policies
The  modern  French  state  was  born  from  violent  revolution  and  continental 
warfare.  For the first time in European warfare, the revolutionary French government 
mobilized the entire nation for war through mass conscription, a practice known as levée 
en masse.   Mass conscription drew a direct  military benefit  from a large population. 
Nationalist revolutions across Europe in the later 19th century adopted total war, making 
European wars of the 19th and 20th centuries the most destructive ever.  Even when a 
country won a total war they suffered huge losses in population and economy.  Concerns 
over inadequate birthrates and population have been a recurring theme in French politics. 
France's strong government, siege mentality that emerged from the French Revolution, 
144 Ibid., 22-24.
145 Rodwin, 2006, 59-66.
66
and huge casualties in a string of wars for the last two centuries gave birth to some of the 
strongest  and most effective pro-natalist  policies in the developed world.   They have 
succeeded to reversing their fertility rate decline since the 1980s to a level that is almost 
at replacement.
The  first  pro-natalist  policies  of  Napoleonic  France  involved  government 
assistance to poor mothers with children and returning women to traditional family roles 
that had them at home having children.146  The French laity pressured the government to 
take a larger role in child welfare out of the humanitarian concern of reducing infanticide, 
and policy-makers reacted favorably with an eye on the additional population it would 
bring.147  Napoleon funded private organizations that encouraged breast-feeding and took 
care of abandoned infants.  He expanded the medieval tradition of tours, discreet cribs 
built  into  the  walls  of  hospitals  where  unwanted  babies  could  be  dropped off  as  an 
alternative to infanticide.  The government would then raise them.  In 1806 he pledged 
the government would raise each family's sixth child (this was never implemented).148 
The tours gradually disappeared from public concern over the expenses they incurred 
during economic recessions of the 1814-1848 Bourbon Restoration.  Thus the first pro-
natalist  policies  were  judged too expensive  and the  long-term economic and military 
benefit of children forgotten.  The popularity of Thomas Malthus' anti-population growth 
thesis  among  contemporary  economists  and  politicians  suppressed  any  move  to 
encourage more children.149
Demographic concern surged in the aftermath of France's defeat to Prussia in the 
1870  Franco-Prussian  War.150  Such  was  the  scale  of  defeat,  both  in  casualties  and 
146 Burton, 176-177.
147 Ibid.




national pride, that French intellectuals bemoaned the decline of French civilization of 
which a declining birth rate was one symptom.  An 1867 report from the French Imperial 
Statistics  Bureau had  warned that  a  shrinking French  population  advantage  over  the 
German states was a national security threat.151  Late 19th and early 20th century France 
caught  pro-natalist  fever  as  intellectuals,  politicians,  and  industrialists  abandoned 
Malthus and revived Napoleon's ideas that the government should directly incentivize 
childbirth.
The pro-natalist movement formed private organizations to lobby the government. 
The proposed carrots included financial assistance to large families, subsidized public 
housing and transport to large families, and even giving an extra vote to fathers with at 
least  three children (women could not  yet vote).152  A stick of punitive taxes on the 
unmarried  and  childless  couples  was  proposed to  help  finance  these  subsidies.   The 
government  incorporated  the  most  influential  of  these  organizations,  the  National 
Alliance for French Population Growth, into the government in 1913.153
In-spite of intense pro-natalist lobbying, political dysfunction delayed significant 
government action until 1913 when two laws gave financial incentives families with three 
or more children, with aid increasing with each child, and subsidized maternity care.154 
The laws' proximate cause was a warning from military planners that France was unable 
to match Germany's standing army size at current birth rates.155  Levée en masse military 







France suffered 1.7 million casualties in  World War I,  17 percent  of all  who 
served, nearly an entire generation of young men (see Figure 13).156  Between 27 and 30 
percent of the standing French army in 1914 was killed.157 So many men died that gender 
imbalance went from a normal half and half ratio to 45 men to 55 women.158  French 
Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau argued after the Treaty of Versailles that raising the 
fertility  rate  was  critical  to  French  security:  “For  if  France  turns  her  back  on  large 
families, one can  put all the clauses one wants in a treaty, one can take all the guns of 




Figure 13: France's demographic transition: 1800 - 1980
Germany, one can do whatever one likes, France will be lost because there will be no 
more Frenchmen.”159  
Such was the French loss of life and continued insecurity about living next to 
Germany  that  pro-natalists  put  their  mission  into  overdrive.   They  demonized  “neo-
Malthusians”  as  undermining  France  and  secretly  cooperating  with  Germany.160  In 
practice, their targets were often abortionists and birth control advocates.  In 1920 the 
government  criminalized  of  abortion,  contraceptives,  and  anyone  advocating  fewer 
children.  The law's authors did not hide their intent to grow the population.  (Romania 
under  Nicolae Ceau escu in  the 1960s restricted family planning with the same pro-ș
natalist objective.)161  The government also increased the 1913 fertility incentives and 
planned to increase them further but for the German economic collapse in the mid-1920s 
which reduced war reparations to France.  Lack of funding forced the government to 
return fertility incentives to 1913 levels, then nearly eliminated them in 1934.  When the 
Great Depression hit France in 1932, tax revenue shrunk and anti-natalists finally got 
political traction saying families were already struggling to support the few children they 
have, why promote more?162  Thus France's second wave of pro-natalist incentives was 
again undone by fiscal problems.  
Family  planning  restrictions  remained  in  place,  and  when  the  Soviet  Union 
banned abortion in 1935, France's Communists followed suit saying a large working class 
was  necessary  to  achieve  revolution.163  The  political  class  united  behind  population 
growth and against family planning, both to maximize “power”: for the nationalists it was 
159 Tomlinson, 409.
160 Ibid., 410-411.
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French national power and for the socialists it was the power of the proletariat.  In 1939, 
France consolidated its pro-natalist policies into the Code de la Famille that not only 
incentivized  children  but  attacked  anything  considered  anti-family:  abortion,  birth 
control, pornography, and alcoholism.164 
World War II inflicted fewer casualties on France than World War I, about half a 
million military and civilian deaths, one third that of World War I.165  France surrendered 
after their army was defeated in the field, and Germany did not target France for the kind 
of systematic destruction it did for Eastern Europe.  The exception, of course, was the 
Jews.  But physical damage was greater because  the war often fought in urban areas 
unlike the rural nature of World War I.  Rebuilding would be no small task, and once 
again a France felt it needed a lot more people than it had.  
In 1945, President Charles de Gaulle called for “twelve million beautiful babies in 
ten  years.”166  He  kept  the  pro-natalist  policies  of  the  Vichy  government,  created  a 
Minister for Population Affairs,  and created a national  population committee.167  The 
birth rate surged as peace unleashed the pent-up desire for starting a family and the pre-
war Code de la Famille kept family planning to a minimum.  One demographer attributed 
10 percent of post-war births to government policies.168  Western Europe and the United 
States also experienced a post-war baby boom.  The surge in births reduced the urgency 
of the pro-natalist  cause in the 1950s.   The 1968 leftist  revolution gave political and 
social voice to a younger generation less concerned about national power.  Leftists re-
164 Philip E. Ogden and Marie-Monique Huss, "Demography and Pronatalism in France in the Nineteenth 
and Twentieth Centuries." Journal of Historical Geography 8, 3 (1982): 293.
165 Wayne C. McWilliams and Harry Piotrowski, The World Since 1945: A History of International  
Relations. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997. P. 12. Print.
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Review, 12 (1986): 323.
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embraced Malthus' population control ideas.  Abortion was legalized in 1975.  In 1982, 
economic recession torpedoed the government's plans for expanded benefits to parents.169 
But fear  of population decline is France's  bête noire,  so when the birth rate dropped 
below replacement in the 1970s, the government expanded pro-natalist policies.170  In 
1976 it set a goal to raise TFR to replacement.171
Throughout  the mid to late  1980s,  France revamped and strengthened its  pro-
natalist policies.  By 1993, families received cash benefits beginning in the fifth month of 
pregnancy and continuing until the baby was three months old.172  For poor families they 
payments keep coming until the child is age three.  The Parenting Allowance is cash 
assistant for one parent to stay home if they have two or more children.  Families also 
receive  subsidized  housing,  child-care,  and  railroad  travel.   An  overarching  Family 
Allowance paid cash to all families with two or more children.  Families with three or  
more children and single parents receive even more assistance, all  on top of France's 
generous welfare system that covers health and education through college.  France has set 
the world standard for pro-natalist incentives.
Unlike Singapore, France's policies seem to have raised the birthrate.  Fertility 
rates bottomed out in 1993 to 1994 at 1.65 and grew to 1.99 in 2008.173  French fertility 
rates were the third highest in Europe after Iceland and Ireland in 2008.174  The developed 
world-wide trend of women delaying childbirth is born out in France where there has 
been a decreasing number of 20-29 year old women giving birth and an increase in 30-39 
year old women giving birth.  There has been a steady rise in births to bi-national couples 
169 Ibid., 321.
170 Leslie King, "France Needs Children." Sociological Quarterly 39, 1 (1998): 41.
171 McIntosh, 319.
172 King, 37.
173 UN Population Division, 2009.
174 Ibid.
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with 18.5 percent of 2006 births going to couples with at least one non-French parent,  
indicating immigration plays an increasing role in fertility.175  In spite of France's positive 
demographic trends, it is still an aging population.  Generous demographic projections 
still have 25 percent of the population over the age of 60 by 2019, up from 21.3 percent  
in 2007.176  More immigration and pension and labor reforms will be needed.
3.4.4 Immigration policies
French immigration policy in the 20th century was driven primarily by short-term 
economic conditions and humanitarian concern.  The humanitarian concern came from 
France's retreating colonial empire that left millions of French citizens and allies at risk, 
and family reunification.  Like Singapore, France has historically complemented its pro-
natalist policies with relatively liberal immigration policies.177   The loss of young male 
life (the core of the workforce) from World War I was so great that France's economy 
needed an immediate demographic shot in the arm,  not  just  higher fertility rates that 
would take a generation to start pay off.  Between 1920 and 1935, France accepted 1.3 
million  foreign  workers  on  top  of  a  post-war  population  of  around  39  million.178 
Immigration  only  slowed  down  down  in  the  mid-1930s  as  unemployment  surged.179
 President  de  Gaulle  repeated  these  policies  after  World  War  II,  accepting 
immigrants  from  southern  Europe  and  its  overseas  colonies.180  Immigration  shifted 
175 France Prioux and Jonathon Mandelbaum, "Recent Demographic Developments in France: Fertility at a 
More than 30-Year High." Population (English Edition, 2002-) 62, 3 (2007): 423.
176 Ibid., 418-419.
177 James F. Hollifield, "Immigration Policy in France and Germany: Outputs versus Outcomes." Annals of  
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 485, 1 (1986): 113-28.





heavily to North Africa in the 1960s and 70s with political unrest and civil war creating 
refugees and France having fewer barriers to entry from its former colonies.181
The  economy  boomed  until  the  mid-1970s.   When  a  recession  hiked 
unemployment,  the government saw no further need for foreign labor and ended legal 
immigration in 1974.  Like the United States' experience trying to close the U.S.-Mexico 
border in the 1980s, this move caused foreigners already in France to stay, knowing they 
would probably not be able to return to France if they left.  Illegal immigration rose as 
foreigners  came  over  on  tourist  or  student  visas  then  stayed.   One  year  after  the 
government  closed  legal  immigration,  they re-allowed  family  reunion immigration  in 
1975 because it was impracticable to enforce the restrictions.182  In 1981, a new leftist 
government  granted  amnesty  to  undocumented  foreigners  living  in  France  and  the 
number of legal immigrants doubled from 1981 to 1982.183  But they failed to liberalize 
immigration policies as the economy worsened throughout the 1980s, and the number of 
immigrants returned to pre-1982 levels from 1983 to 1989.
France has accepted more immigrants since the 1990s, rising from 119,00 in 1994 
to  211,000 in 2008.184  The  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union created  a  boom in Eastern 
European  immigrants,  with  another  boomlet  following  the  2004  accession  of  eight 
Eastern  European  nations  to  the  European  Union  (EU)  (see  Figure  14).   African 
immigrants have formed a plurality of immigrants since 2000, and Asians continue to rise 
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The domestic politics of immigration in France are complex.  Assimilation is a 
national obsession and some scholars and policy-makers say a failure.185  On one hand 
France  does  not  have  a  national  ethnicity  or  religion,  and  promotes  equality  of  all 
citizens.  Immigrants and low income residents receive generous welfare benefits.  Thus 
in principle  France is a welcoming place for immigrants.   On the other hand, France 
expects  citizens  adopt  French  culture  and  has  little  tolerance  for  other  customs. 
Immigrants and their descendants were cut out of French politics, discriminated against 
by employers and landlords, and omitted from official statistics that ignore ethnicity (and 
therefore ignore divergent economic and social conditions among immigrant groups).186 
The French belief in the superiority of their culture is not new.  More than any other 
185 Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Michael J. Balz, "The October Riots in France: A Failed Immigration 
Policy or the Empire Strikes Back?" International Migration 44, 2 (2006): 23, accessed March 12, 2011, 
doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2435.2006.00362.x
186 Alain Blum, "Resistance to Identity Categorization in France." Ed. David I. Kertzer and Dominique 
Arel. Census and Identity: the Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Census. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge UP, 2002. 121-47.
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Figure 14: Source of immigration to France: 1994 - 2008
European colonizer, nationalism drove France's colonial empire when it was known as 
mission civilicatrice.187
Problems  of  assimilation  arose  not  from first  generation  immigrants  but  their 
descendants who grew up confined to the margins of society.188  Scholars realized there 
was a problem long before second and third generation immigrant youths rioted in Paris 
suburbs in October 2005.189  French hip hop lyrics screamed the hopelessness of the cités 
(public housing projects) from the 1980s but the political class was not listening.190  Since 
the 2005 riots, France has struggled develop constructive policies that do not undermine 
core values.  Affirmative action is by definition in-egalitarian.  Subsidies for mosques in 
order to co-opt them for the government would undermine secularism.  The traditional 
French response to economic distress is more government assistance, but policy-makers 
wonder what more can they do when residents of the cités already live in public housing, 
receive  national  health  care  and  education,  and if  they  have  families  receive  further 
subsidies.   There  has  been  progress  in  reforming  the  education  system  to  be  more 
meritocratic, allowing bright students of all neighborhoods to get into elite schools.191
France's experience with immigration is typical of Western nations in two ways. 
First is the unpredictability of immigration policy.  What policy-makers intend to happen 
and what actually happens have been far apart since World War II.  The general idea was 
to recruit foreigners judged most likely to assimilate—southern European Catholics—for 
immigration to boost the population, and others from the colonies to work for a period of 
time and then go home.  What happened was the supply of southern European labor dried 
187 Haddad and Balz, 25.
188 Ibid.
189 Alec G. Hargreaves, Immigration, 'Race' and Ethnicity in Contemporary France. London: Routledge,
1995. P. 148.
190  André J.M. Prévos, "The Evolution of French Rap Music and Hip Hop Culture in the 1980s and 
1990s." The French Review 68, 5 (1996): 713-25.
191 Haddad and Balz, 28-29.
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up as  their  own economies  improved,  while  Africans  stayed because  they  developed 
social ties to France and saw political upheaval in their home countries.  France also did 
not expect so many refugees from their overseas colonies.  Singapore and Japan have 
tighter controls on immigration and the activities of foreigners in their borders.  They 
rigorously enforce the distinction between a temporary resident and immigrant, whereas 
in Western nations temporary residents have easier paths to permanent residency and 
citizenship.
Second  are  the  thorny  issues  of  assimilation  in  developed  nations.   In  2010, 
German  Chancellor  Angela  Merkel  said  multi-culturalism  had  failed  and  immigrants 
needed to put more effort into assimilating.192  In 2011, British Prime Minister David 
Cameron193 and  French  President  Nicolas  Sarkozy194 said  the  same  thing  about 
immigrants in the UK and France, respectively.  None proposed policy changes so as of 
2011 there is only rhetoric.  But anti-immigration and cultural nationalist politicians and 
parties have scored victories across Europe in the last decade.  They are tapping into 
rising nativist feelings that come from insecurities over the economy, terrorism, and low 
non-immigrant birth rates.
3.4.5 Conclusion
More than any other country except perhaps Israel, France has concerned itself 
with  demographics.   It  has  done  so  for  the  same  reason  Israel  promotes  Jewish 
192 "Merkel Says German Multicultural Society Has Failed." BBC. 17 Oct. 2010. Web. Accessed March 
11, 2011.
193 "State Multiculturalism Has Failed, Says David Cameron." BBC. 5 Feb. 2011. Web. Accessed March, 
11 2011. 
194 "Multiculturalism Has Failed, Says French President." AFP. 10 Feb. 2010. Web. Accessed March 11, 
2011.
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immigration, an acute sense of vulnerability.195  Revolutionary France was born at a time 
of  war  when  the  nation  needed  all  the  bodies  it  could  muster  to  fight  the  allied 
monarchies of Europe.  It pioneered a form of warfare that mobilized an entire nation, so 
the larger the population the better.  Three immensely destructive wars in less than one 
century created the an economic need for workers as well.  France's pro-natalist policies 
are the most comprehensive in the world, as well as the most expensive.  Several times in 
history the government scaled back its incentives during economic recessions because 
they were unaffordable.
France's  fiscal  situation  in  the  long-run  is  grim.   Even  with  its  relatively 
successful pro-natalist policies and net inflow of immigrants, the population will continue 
to age and the dependency ratio of retired elderly to working population will grow.  This 
could lead to curtailing the financial aid to parents.  Even if the pension system raise the 
retirement  age and encourage seniors to keep working in old age,  seniors draw more 
medical benefits.  A steadily increasing population is essential to maintaining France's 
much-loved welfare system and quality of life.  How much comes from natural growth 
vs. immigration, and how policy achieves these outcomes, will be a contentious issue in 
the future.





Japan appears to be a worst-case scenario in economic demography: low birthrate, 
high  life  expectancy  for  the  elderly,  generous  pension  benefits,  and  virtually  no 
immigration or guest workers.  To make matters worse, the economy has been moribund 
since 1991 and the government carries one of the highest ratios of national debt to GDP 
in the world, although Japanese debt is considered some of the safest in the world.  Japan 
used to be a great economic power that commanded the respect and envy of much of the 
world including the United States.  American companies studied the Japanese business 
model and predicted dates at which Japan would overtake the United States as the world's 
largest economy.  It is hard to believe now that in the 1960s and 70s the government was 
concerned about overpopulation.  Between 1945 and 1970 the population had risen 45 
percent at an average annual rate of 1.5 percent.196  Population growth accelerated in the 
1ate 1960s and peaked in 1972.  From 1985 to 2009, the average annual population 
increase  was  0.2  percent.   Fertility  rates  peaking  in  1971  at  2.16  then  dropped 
dramatically until bottoming out at 1.26 in 2005 (see Figure 15).197
196 Japan Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/jinsui/2.htm, 
accessed March 13, 2011.
197 UN Population Division.
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Low fertility rates are both a symptom and cause of the economic malaise Japan 
has been stuck in the last  two decades.   An aging and shrinking labor force feeds a 
pessimism of  the  future  that  weighs  on  couples'  child-bearing  decision.  A shrinking 
number  of  young  people  reduces  entrepreneurship  and  cements  in  place  the  staid, 
conservative  political  class  that  is  keeping  Japan  sluggish.   The  elderly  have  more 
political power than the young so pension reform is likely to mean higher contributions 
rather than reduced benefits.  The xenophobic culture resists immigration and large scale 
guest worker programs, but without labor reforms to create more opportunities for the 
young to enter and rise through the labor force foreign labor would not solve the problem.
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Japan Fertility Rates: 1960 - 2008
Source: U.N. Population Division
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Figure 15: Japan fertility rates: 1960 - 2008
3.5.2 Old age support system
Japan's social welfare programs include a semi-defined benefits pension system at 
age 65 (60 with reduced benefits)  and universal  health coverage.   Three overlapping 
programs  provide  pension  benefits:  the  National  Pension  (NP),  Employees'  Pension 
Insurance (EPI), and Mutual Aid Associations (MAA).198  NP pays old age, disability, 
and survivors' pensions.  Old age benefits are a function of how long they have paid in to 
the system, regardless of income.199  Twenty five years is the minimum to receive any 
benefit and forty years qualifies for the maximum benefit, which in FY2009 was about 
$717 a month.200  Benefit growth is tied to an index of consumer price inflation (CPI), 
real wage growth, and the change in disposable income as a proportion of total gross 
income.201  In 2007, there were 2.77 contributers to each beneficiary, slightly fewer than 
the American Social Security system.202
Supplementing  NP  pensions  are  EPI  or  MAA.   EPI  covers  private  sector 
employees and the MAAs cover public sector and private school employees.  Both are 
mandatory for the groups they cover and pay benefits indexed to a beneficiary's lifetime 
earnings.  About fifty five percent of retirees receive both NP and EPI/MAA benefits, 
with  the  remaining  population  receiving  only  NP  because  they  were  self-employed, 
unemployed, farmers, or dependent spouses of employees.
As of 2009, a private sector employee contributes 14.996 percent of their income 
and  will  receive  NP and  EPI  benefits.   A public  sector  or  private  school  employee 
contributes  between 11.876 and 14.896 percent  and receives  NP and MAA benefits. 
198 Junichi Sakamoto, Demographic Aging and Japan's Public Pension System. Rep. no. 54. Nomura 
Research Institute, 10 Apr. 2009. Web, accessed March 13, 2011. P. 12.
199 Ibid., 16.





These rates will rise 0.354 percent annually until stabilizing at 18.3 percent in FY2017.203 
Citizens who only qualify for  NP paid about $159 a month in  FY2009, with a  low-
income exemption.204  They will have to pay an additional three dollars annually until 
stabilizing  in  FY2017.   Like  the  American  and  French pensions,  revenues  exceeded 
benefits for most of their history and the balance was invested in pension funds.  At the 
end of March 2007, the total pension fund balance was $1.7 trillion.
Japan's pension system is a hybrid defined-benefits, defined-contributions setup 
because  reforms  in  2004  tied  future  benefit  increases  to  a  demographic  and  life 
expectancy index.205
Post-2004 Benefit Formula = (1 + normal index) 
__________________________________________
[(1 + (rate of decrease in pension schemes' contributers) + (rate of increase in 
life expectancy at age 65 (fixed at 0.03 percent))]206
This is a hybrid system in which demography keeps benefits in check while maintaining a 
minimum level of benefits.  Japan intends to transition to a system in which benefits are 
determined solely by available revenue, which will be fixed at 18.3 percent of workers' 
income  in  FY2017.   This  hybrid  system  makes  pensions  demographically  safe  but 
reduces pensioners' quality of life.  Average benefits (NP + EPI/MAA) in 2009 were 59.2 






and is projected to fall  to 50.2 percent by 2023.  This 50.2 percent  replacement was 
projected to be sustainable in 2004.
No matter how sophisticated the benefit formulas, Japan's pension plans cannot 
escape the demographic reality that there is a falling number of workers supporting a 
growing number of beneficiaries.  The 2004 reforms stated that if replacement fell below 
50  percent  the  pension  system  would  need  further  restructuring.207  In  fact,  the 
demographic projections on which the 2004 reforms were based have turned out overly 
optimistic by 2006, with replacement falling below 50 percent in FY2027. The share of 
population over 65 in 2011 is 22.9 percent, and by 2030 that is projected to rise to 30.2 
percent (see Table 6).  The dependency ratio will grow from 56.3 percent in 2011 to 69.2 
percent  in  2030.   Further  reforms,  or  a  reversal  in  demographic  and  labor  market 
fortunes, look increasingly necessary to maintain the system's solvency.
Like most developed nations, the Japanese government provides universal health 
care.  Employees usually receive health insurance through their employer in a system 
207 Ibid., 8.
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Table 6: Age structure of Japan: 2011 - 2030
known  as  Employees'  Health  Insurance  (EHI),  and  if  they  lose  their  job,  work  for 
themselves, or retire, they are required to purchase insurance from the government in a 
system called National Health Insurance (NHI).208  Japan's health care system resembles 
France's in its model of fee-for-service, high utilization, low costs to the patient.  Like 
France, patients can see any doctor they want and do not need a referral in order for their 
health insurance to pay.  Costs are kept low by government control on reimbursement 
fees.  With its large market share, the government can set prices that providers have to 
take.  Health outcomes are some of the best in the world with longest life expectancy 
over and at age 65 in the world.209  
There are several problems with the Japanese health system going forward.  First, 
its world-leading health outcomes can be partially attributed to an excellent diet heavy on 
fish, fewer car accidents from greater use of public transit, and compulsory health checks 
paid for by employers, not the health care system, that catch diseases early.210  Mortality 
rates for specific diseases are sometimes higher than in other developed nations.211  There 
is large variation in the quality of care around the country.  Moreover, the government 
has controlled costs almost entirely by cutting reimbursement fees and not by controlling 
supply and demand.  As providers' fees have gone down, they have seen more patients 
and attempted more procedures, increasing health care utilization and keeping overall 
costs on the rise.212  Unlike France, there is little central management of the health care 
208 Heang Chhor, Diana Farrell, Nicolaus Henke, and Sonosuke Kadonaga, "The Challenge of Reforming 
Japan's Health System", McKinsey & Company, Nov. 2008. Web, accessed March 15, 2011. 
<www.mckinsey.com/mgi/reports/pdfs/reforming_Japan_health/Japan_Healthcare_Provision.pdf>. P. 8. 
209 "Life Expectancy at 65: Live Long and Prosper", The Economist, 11 Dec. 2009. Web, accessed  March 
15, 2011. <http://www.economist.com/node/15098902?story_id=E1_TVDJRJDN>.




system,  and  thus  little  they  can  do  to  reform  the  system  other  than  adjusting 
reimbursement fees.  
Japan's health care system may become a victim of its own success, having to 
scale  back  the  quality  of  its  care  because  of  its  success  in  extending the  life  of  its 
population.   Life  expectancy for  men and women in 1947 was 10.1 and 12.2 years, 
respectively.213  By 2009 it had risen to 18.6 and 23.64 years.  With more workers living 
to retirement age, more retirees living longer, and more medical procedures available to 
treat retirees, health expenditures on the elderly population will arguably grow faster than 
pension benefits.  Unlike Japan's pension system, the health care system does not have a 
system  in  place  for  holding  contributions  (taxes  and  premiums)  steady  and  making 
benefits a share of available revenues.
3.5.3 Family policies
Japan's population surged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as death rates 
rapidly declined from industrialization during the Meiji Restoration (1868-1912).  The 
population  doubled  from 1872  to  1937 when Imperial  Japan  invaded  China.214  The 
population growth came entirely from natural growth because Japan has historically been, 
and remains today, an insular, ethnically homogeneous society.  The Meiji and Imperial 
leaders  instituted  a  strict  interpretation  of  neo-Confucianism  that  assigned  roles  to 
everyone  in  society.215  Women  were  to  be  the  consummate  housewife,  loyal  and 
213 "Abridged Life Tables for Japan 2009." Statistics and Information Department. Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare. Web, accessed 15 Mar. 2011. <http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/database/db-
hw/lifetb09/index.html>.
214  “Population by Sex, Population Increase and Decrease, Population Density (1872-2009)”, Japan 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, web, accessed March 15, 2011.
215 Robert J. Smith, "Making Village Women into "Good Wives and Wise Mothers" in Prewar Japan", 
Journal of Family History 8.1 (1983): 75. Print. 
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deferential to her husband.  To not bear a child within three years of marriage was a 
disgrace.216  Like France, the Meiji leaders saw a large population a perquisite to military 
strength.217  They banned contraceptives.218  The government view was known as umeyo-
fuyaseyo  (give birth and multiply).219 Yet their  fertility fell  26 percent from the early 
1920s to the late 1930s.220  As the war in Asia and the Pacific expanded, Japan's military 
leaders called for more children.221  Similar to fascist Germany, Imperial Japan believed 
their race to be superior and their nation divinely guided.  More children were not just a 
military necessity, they fulfilled a divine mission.
Japan suffered huge population losses in World War II (which for Japan started in 
1937).  Casualties are estimated at 2.3 million, about 4 percent of the pre-war population 
of 70 million.222  Whereas the population grew 12 percent in the nine years preceding the 
outbreak of war, it only grew 2 percent from 1937-1945.223 If the average pre-war annual 
population growth rate of 1.4 percent was maintained throughout the war, Japan would 
have had a 1945 population of 79 million instead of the actual 72 million.  Thus it is 
apparent  that  the war not  only killed 2.3 million Japanese,  it  prevented the births of 
another 6.7 million because of the uncertainty of the wartime economy and all the men 
deployed overseas/killed.
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Like the rest of the war's participants, Japan experienced a post-war baby boom 
because men returning from overseas could finally start a family.  Population growth 
averaged 2.9 percent from 1946-1950.224  But the baby boom ended sooner than other 
developed nations, partly because in 1948 the government made abortion, sterilization, 
and contraception easier to obtain to slow growth.225  The economic situation in post-war 
Japan was dire and society feared American occupation.  Couples' natal enthusiasm was 
tempered by a pessimism of the future.226  Fertility dropped off rapidly, falling 50 percent 
from 1947 to 1957.227  Just as 1988 was an auspicious year for babies in Chinese culture, 
1966 was an inauspicious year in Japanese culture, explaining the dramatic 26 percent 
decline in fertility from 1965 to 1966.228  Fertility peaked in 1971, one year after Prime 
Minister Eisaku Sato shocked the nation by calling for more higher fertility rates.229 
The prevailing view in Japan and the developed world in the 1960s was that 
overcrowding and overpopulation was the source of many of the world's problems.  Paul 
Ehrlich's  1968  The  Population  Bomb was  the  most  public  of  scores  of  doomsday, 
overpopulation literature.  Sato was reacting to a government council that warned Japan's 
pension system was unsustainable.230  This set off a debate over population growth at the 
same time Western academia was debating this issue.  Those advocating slow growth 
pointed to overcrowding in Japanese cities while proponents pointed to alleged labor 
shortages  and  long-term  sustainability  of  the  pension  system.231  Ultimately  the 
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In 1990, the government revealed that TFR had fallen to 1.57 in the previous year, 
down 5.4 percent from 1988.232  This was the largest single year drop since 1974-75. 
What became known as “1.57shock” spurred the government to introduce the first overtly 
pro-natalist policies since World War II.  In 1992 the government created the Child Care 
Leave Law to allow full-time employees to take up to one year of leave to care for a child 
under one year old.233  In 1995 they created the Angel Plan to help women work and raise 
a family at the same time.  Child-care facilities were to be tripled by 1999, emergency 
child-care facilities raised by a factor of six, and after school clubs doubled.234  
When this was not enough (TFR declined from 1.42 in 1995 to 1.32 in 1999),235 
the government followed it with the “New Angel Plan” for 2000-2004 to increase the 
assistance given to working mothers and create a family-friendly workplace.  Maternity 
leave was now compensated with 40 percent of salary, public employees got up to three 
years of child care leave, and the child tax credit was extended from age three to six, and 
working hours reduced.236  In 2001, the government created the “Zero Waiting for Day 
Care Program” that increased the number of child-care facilities.237  The child tax credit 
was extended from age six to completion of the third grade in 2003 (age 9).238  The 
“Children  and Childrearing Support Plan” replaced the New Angel Plan for the 2005-
2009 period and continued the focus on allowing family and career to coexist.239  It added 
a  new  focus  on  fathers  by  trying  to  curtail  overtime  hours  and  encourage  men  to 
contribute more to parents.  This was a major cultural shift in the patriarchal culture that  
232  G. Vogt, 18; UN Population Division.
233 Yusuke Date and Satoshi Shimizutani, "Why Has Japan's Fertility Rate Declined?: An Empirical 
Literature Survey with an Emphasis on Policy Implications", Japanese Economy 34, 1 (2007): 32.
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still saw men as the primary breadwinners and women as the primary parent.  Direct 
financial  assistance  to  parents  is  small  compared  to  other  developed  nations  like 
Singapore and France.240
From 1980 to 1992, fertility  rates declined at an average annual rate of -1.24 
percent.  From 1993 to 2008, the average annual decline in fertility was -0.68 percent.  If  
all things were equal, the pro-natalist policies could take credit halving the rate of the 
decline.   A literature  review of  Japanese  pro-natalist  policy  evaluation  by  Date  and 
Shimizutani (2007) show that family leave systems probably increase fertility.241  High 
child-care availability is correlated with more first children but not second children.242 
Because direct financial assistance to parents is not large in Japan, it has not been studied 
adequately.243  There  have  been  no  cost-benefit  analysis  that  weighs  the  cost  of  the 
programs against any attributed increase in fertility.
3.5.4 Immigration policies
Low  immigration  and  guest  worker  numbers  distinguish  Japan  from  other 
developed  nations.   As  an  ethnically  homogeneous  country  for  centuries,  Japan  has 
struggled to craft  guest worker/immigration policies that sustain the economy without 
upsetting the citizenry.  Whereas other developed nations have accepted immigrants to 
fill  low-skill  jobs,  Japan has  been reluctant  to  do even that.   Many have come over 
temporary visas and worked illegally.  A large number of Koreans and Chinese came 
over during the 1930s and 40s on account of Japan's empire, often as forced labor.  Most 
returned home after  World  War  II  but  about  680,000 Koreans  and  130,000 Chinese 





stayed,  forming the  basis  of  Japan's  first  significant  minority.244  They were  granted 
citizenship in 1952.245  Between 1945 and 1980 there was little foreign in-spite of the fact 
that Japan suffered a huge population loss and destruction from the war.  This was made 
possible  by  rapid  advancement  in  technology  and  a  large  rural  population  that  was 
recruited into modern factories.246
Immigration attitudes and policies began to change in the mid-1980s.  Japan's 
economy was expanding on a real estate bubble and hired up all domestic labor.  Japan 
only allowed foreign workers with skills that could not be found in Japan.247  In 1985 the 
yen  appreciated  in  value  making  Japanese  salaries  much  higher  than  their  Asian 
neighbors.248  China allowed more emigrants after 1985.249  These forces created strong 
demand  for  and  supply  of  illegal  un-skilled  labor.   By  1989,  an  estimated  100,000 
foreigners were illegally  working in  Japan.250  By the late  1980s,  the issue of illegal 
foreign labor made its way into the media and policy circles.  In 1989 the government 
liberalized its foreign worker policy by allowing foreigners to “train on the job” (i.e. 
work) for up to two-thirds of their time in Japan.251  It also streamlined visa procedures 
and made it easier for foreigners to get a residency permit.  Significant penalties were 
added to employers of illegal foreign labor.
The  1990  reforms  increased  the  number  of  unskilled  foreigners  in  Japan  by 
making it  easier  to  enter  the country and find an employer.   In  1991 there  were an 
244 Keiko Yamanaka, "New Immigration Policy and Unskilled Foreign Workers in Japan", Pacific Affairs 
66, 1 (1993): 74. 









estimated 500,000 such workers.252  Arrests of illegal workers jumped from 8,000 in 1986 
to 31,000 in 1991, and at which time there were any estimated 300,000 illegal workers.253 
Japan differs from most  developed nations by refusing permanent  residency status to 
guest  workers  except  those  who  are  ethnically  Japanese.254  There  is  no  birthright 
citizenship for the children of foreigners.255  By refusing citizenship to all but ethnically 
Japanese, the government is tying Japanese identity to ethnicity.256
Like guest worker programs in Western Europe, Japan's temporary workers tend 
to  stick  around,  forming  a  permanent  under-class  of  residents.257  Foreign  workers 
continued  to  come  to  Japan  through  the  economic  recession  of  the  1990s  even  as 
unemployment  rose.258  Japan has  made  progress  on  improving the  rights  and living 
conditions  of  foreigners  since  the  1990s.259  Foreigners  have  become  increasingly 
involved  in  Japanese  civil  society  and  public  opinion  polls  show  majorities  are 
consistently open to granting them voting rights in local elections.260
3.5.5 Conclusion
While Japan appears at firsts glance to be a worse case scenario for the economic 
problems associated with aging, a closer examination shows Japan is not much different 
from other developed nations.  There are two exceptions: the early decline in fertility and 
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southern Europe, life expectancy is only slightly higher than the developed world, and 
their pension and health systems are no more generous than Western Europe's.  What 
makes Japan's situation especially grim is the early decline in fertility which fell below 
replacement in the 1950s.  Sub-replacement TFR did not occur until 1972 in the United 
States, 1975 in France, and 1977 in Singapore.  Moreover, the United States and France 
reversed  their  fertility  declines  whereas  Japan's  has  continued  downwards  since  the 
1970s.  And while Singapore, the United States, and France are officially OK with a 
multi-ethnic society, Japan is not.
Japan is making small  progress in raising its  fertility rate  and big progress in 
integrating  foreigners  into  society.   But  demographic  projections  are  not  getting  any 
better so wholesale change in population policy may be necessary to maintain the high 
standard of living.
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Chapter 4: Analysis and Recommendations
4.1 DETERMINANTS OF POPULATION POLICY
This report tackles three research questions: What historical and economic factors 
explain population policy?  What is the demographic future of advanced economies? 
How can public policy affect demographic destiny?  Comparing four developed nations 
show the diversity in approaches to population policy and inconsistent policy outcomes 
that  underline  the  need to  understand each country's  political  and economic  context. 
Their histories offer lessons to developing nations who will one day grapple with the 
same challenges as developed nations.
To  answer  the  first  question,  the  spectrum of  perceived  threats  best  explains 
attitudes toward population growth.  Tiny Singapore, surrounded by huge and unstable 
neighbors, saw economic development as key to national survival.  In the 1950s and 60s, 
development was supposed to come from lower birth rates.  But when birthrates sunk too 
low to jeopardize Singapore's long-term growth, the government reversed course in the 
1980s.  France in the mid-19th century embraced Malthus' ideas that population growth 
was bad, but humiliating defeat at the hands of Prussia in 1871 caused them to reverse 
course and advocate population growth.  For Singapore, population policy was framed in 
an economic and social development context.  For France, population policy was framed 
first by military and social considerations, then by economic concerns from the 1980s to 
the present day.
The  United  States  promoted  population  growth  when  it  was  a  young  nation 
vulnerable to European powers.  American leaders were preoccupied with the occupying 
frontier, ensuring territorial integrity, and reducing dependence on foreign trade.  As the 
U.S. became increasingly self-confident and militarily powerful in the second half of the 
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19th century, they stopped promoting population growth per se but continued accepting 
large numbers of immigrants for economic and humanitarian reasons.   Since the late 
1800s the U.S. has not had a national population policy like other developed nations 
because it does not need one.  The U.S. has a relatively high fertility rate and absorbs 
large numbers of immigrants annually.
Japan promoted population growth from the Meiji to the Imperial periods when its 
leaders felt great urgency in industrializing and strengthening the country.  As Japan's 
empire expanded into Korea and China,  then across Southeast  Asia and the Western 
Pacific,  its population  strained.  After World War II,  the U.S. ensconced Japan in a 
protective alliance that allowed Japan to focus entirely on its domestic affairs.  They no 
longer feared foreign invasion.  Japan rode the demographic bubble until 1991 when it 
became clear their economic system would not survive the rate of aging.
Political scientists would not find this determinant of population policy surprising. 
A common understanding of policy-making is that when the public feels something is 
wrong, they turn to  the government to “do something” even if  that  something is  not 
directly  related  to  the  problem.   Such was the  case  when France  incorrectly  blamed 
demographic decline for its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War.  But demography poses a 
unique challenge to policy-makers, the “do something” cry may come too late.  Japan 
should have begun pro-natalist policies in the 1960s to avoid the fiscal problems of aging 
seen today.  Population policy is a long-term issue that needs long-term planning.
Another  determinant  of  population  policy  is  the  tension  between  what  an 
individual family wants and what the government wants.  Ideally, young families and the 
governments' goals and abilities would be aligned so the government can step out of the 
picture.  But this is not the case in developed nations because children are a positive 
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externality.  The ones bearing most of the costs—parents—are not the ones reaping the 
long-term  economic  benefit—the  rest  of  society.   From  parents'  perspectives,  the 
economic rationale for children has disappeared.  From the government's perspective, 
which  is  to  survey the  whole  economy,  the  economic  rationale  is  as  strong as  ever. 
Effective population policy rests on policy-makers' ability to compensate parents for their 
children and demonstrate the benefits of a high fertility rate.
The demographic future of advanced economies rests on the politics of population 
policy.  Battle lines will be drawn through old age support systems, family policy, and 
immigration policy.  When policies are debated in the abstract, with consequences years 
away, politics tends to be along ideological lines.  But when policy immediately affect 
people, interest groups will form from those affected.  Sustaining old age support system 
will require either cutting or delaying benefits, raising taxes, or expanding the workforce. 
The generation with the most political muscle will bend policy to its will.
Given the underwhelming results of pro-natalist policies, all developed nations 
will have to accept large number of immigrants in order to maintain a young and growing 
population.  The U.S. and France have some of the highest fertility rates among advanced 
economies  yet  will  only  hold  their  population  stable  without  immigration.   A stable 
population will still endure increasing old age dependency ratios that draw heavily on the 
public treasury.
It is not clear how generational differences will affect immigration policy.  Young 
people tend to be more socially liberal and open to a multi-ethnic society than the elderly. 
Yet they also have more to lose in the short-run from competition for jobs, especially 
from skilled immigrants.  A labor shortage brought on by an aging population helps the 
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working class initially by raising wages and increasing employment.  But the probable 
tax hike to support the retired population would bite them back.
Developed nations' demographic future also hinges on the accepted role of the 
government in society.  Singapore, France, and Japan have strong central governments 
with  a  history  of  social  engineering.   Their  citizenries  expect  public  policy  to  solve 
problems.   The  United  States  is  a  federal  system  with  more  popular  skepticism  of 
government  than  most  developed nations.   Germany's  fascist  history  with  population 
policy made the topic verboten until 1990.261
4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
There has been insufficient research on the effectiveness of specific pro-natalist 
policies because most fertility research has focused on how to reduce fertility rates and 
achieve the “demographic dividend.”  This will change as more governments try to raise 
fertility (see Table 1).  Th research conducted so far has been wildly inconsistent.
Research  into  pro-natalist  policies  must  control  for  several  factors  including 
family background,  education,  economic status,  and religiosity.   A longitudinal study 
would  match  fertility  data  with  policy  data  to  see  if  policies  are  the  cause.   If  the 
government increases cash grants for children and fertility rises but the number of people 
taking  advantage  of  those  benefits  remains  steady,  perhaps  out  of  ignorance  of  the 
benefits, then benefits are not the cause.
Another  important  and  under-researched  topic  is  a  cost  effectiveness  of  the 
policies.  Do the benefits of children justify the extra cost?  Are people taking advantage 
261 Ilona Ostner and Christoph Schmitt. "Family Policies in Germany", Ed. Ilona Ostner and Christoph 
Schmitt, Family Policies in the Context of Family Change, by Sigrid Leitner. Wiesbaden: VS, Verl. Fu r 
Sozialwiss., 2008. P. 175-176.
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of the benefits but having the same number of children they would have had without the 
incentives?  
A  cost-benefit  equation  would  analyze  the  direct  incentive  costs,  the  indirect 
marginal costs (more spending on education, police, pensions, etc.), and the marginal loss 
in productivity that comes from parents taking time off work to take care of their children 
against  the expected lifetime earnings of additional  people.   The costs  per  additional 
person are relatively uniform but the benefits are not.  Even in a liberal democracy that 
values equal opportunity for all citizens, lifetime earnings are a function of both personal 
achievement and birth circumstances such as parental education.  These lifetime earnings 
determinants could be modeled to find the most economically-beneficial policies.  For 
example,  incentivizing  larger  families  for  college  graduates,  as  Singapore  did  in  the 
1980s,  could  theoretically  get  the  most  bang  for  the  government's  buck  if  college 
graduates' children are statistically more likely to be high-earners than children whose 
parents lack a degree, but it would run counter to egalitarian values.  On the other hand, it 
is  cheaper  to  encourage  low-income  families  to  have  additional  children  than  high-
income families because the opportunity cost of children is lower.  Balancing economic 
efficiency,  public  policy,  and  ethics  is  an  essential  part  of  the  population  policy 
discussion.
Economic concern has never been the only driver of pro-natalism.  There is also 
the social and political impetus to have more of a nation's “own” children rather than 
accept immigrants.  It is politically unfeasible in most countries to accept immigrants as a 
solution their demographic problems.
More research is  needed on creating an age-friendly salary structure.   Current 
systems that encourage company loyalty make senior workers more expensive than their 
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productivity,  and thus  the  company tries  to  push  them out.   Section  4.6  will  further 
discuss this issue.
4.3 ALL NATIONS SHOULD MAINTAIN GROWING POPULATIONS
A steadily increasing population is essential to maintaining low dependency ratios 
and a high quality of life.  Even if there were no public expenditures on the elderly, an 
aging and shrinking population would lead to labor shortages and overburden younger 
family members who will  be expected to take care of their older parents.  Nearly all 
developed nations  have assistance  programs for  the  elderly  that  rely  on taxes  of  the 
working  age  population.   Contrary  to  popular  perception,  what  one  pays  into  those 
systems is not what they get out.  They all rely on multiple workers per beneficiary to 
remain solvent, and adjust benefits according to beneficiary's earning history, inflation, 
and contemporary income.
An  aging  population  will  not  immediately  put  pressure  on  a  government's 
finances  because  people  tend  to  increase  their  productivity  throughout  life.   The 
exception is for people involved in manual labor for which aging decreases productivity. 
A 65 year-old lawyer will probably earn more than a 25 year-old lawyer, but a 65-year 
old construction worker will probably not match the productivity of a 25 year-old.   The 
fiscal hit comes when a worker at the top of their earning potential retires.  For example, 
an individual making $100,000 a year and paying $30,000 in taxes,  who retires with 
$40,000 in pension and health benefits, becomes a $70,000 liability to the government 
with the expenditures and lost taxes.  The economy loses that individual's $100,000 of 
productivity, plus the deadweight loss in economic efficiency that comes from taxing 
others to pay for those old age benefits.  The cumulative effect of millions of workers 
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retiring at the peak of their earning power and drawing a pension could cause severe 
fiscal problems.
A steadily  growing  population  avoids  the  need  to  cut  benefits  or  raise  taxes 
because each generation of workers will be larger than the one it supports.  If the increase 
comes  from more  children,  that  will  pressure  the  working cohort  but  a  large  young 
population  is  far  cheaper  than  a  large  old  population.   This  assumes  the  rest  of  the 
economy is healthy and growing.
Aging is like a train in that it is easy to see where it is going, takes a while to get  
there, but once mass retirement hits corrections are hard to make.  It is unfeasible to 
reduce benefits on those already retired or near retirement.  Promoting more children as 
the number of retirees jumps would create a bulge of non-workers at each end of the 
population pyramid, squeezing the 20-64 age population who must support their parents 
and children.   Pro-natalist  policies  must  be implemented at  least  18 years before  the 
population bulge retires.
Middle-income nations like Brazil and China will probably encounter the same 
demographic problems unless they learn from the experiences of the developed world. 
Both are seeing a bulge in their labor forces from low fertility rates, coupled with strong 
economic growth.  So did Europe and Japan in the 1950s-1980s.  Japan was content to let 
the good times roll and ignore the demographic trends.  Demographers sounded the alarm 
too late and most developed nations have struggled at great cost to raise fertility rates. 
China  will  probably  reverse  course  from  discouraging  childbirth  to  aggressively 
promoting it within two decades, just like Singapore and Japan.
What  about  Malthus  and  Ehrlich's  arguments  about  an  over-crowded  world? 
Even if one does not accept their warnings of imminent doom, it is hard to believe the 
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planet could accommodate a growing population indefinitely.  But if there is anything the 
history of population has demonstrated it is that fears of overpopulation in the long-run 
are unfounded.  Innovation and scientific discovery have enabled humanity to live longer, 
healthier lives in denser urban areas with greater abundance of consumer goods.  Rather 
than being a Ponzi scheme in which collapse is inevitable, a relatively free economy 
adjusts  well  to  population  pressures.   More  demand  leads  to  higher  prices  which 
incentivize innovation on the supply side and conservation on the demand side.
In 1000 A.D., the world population was estimated to be between 254 and 345 
million people.262  They probably had a hard time imagining a world twice as populace, 
let alone 25 times.  Yet in 2011 at 6.7 billion people the world is more prosperous than it  
has ever been.  Who is to say a world with 30 billion people would not be even better? 
That is a lot more brains collaborating on the world's problems, standing on the shoulders 
of  today's  giants.   This  report  recommends  all  nations  today,  developed  and  under-
developed, aspire for a growing young population for at least next fifty years.
4.4 INCREASING THE WORKFORCE: PRO-NATALIST POLICIES VS. GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS VS. 
IMMIGRATION
Governments looking to mitigate their demographic problems by growing their 
workforce have four options: increase the labor force participation rate, encourage their 
citizens  to  have  more  children,  accept  more  temporary  workers,  and/or  accept  more 
permanent immigrants.  The labor force participation rate is the share of any age cohort 
that works or is looking for work.  It excludes students, homemakers, and the disabled. 
The dilemma is that the primary determinants of workforce participation among young 
262 “Historical Estimates of World Population”, U.S. Census Bureau, web, accessed 23 Mar. 2011: 
<http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/worldhis.html>.
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adults are education and fertility.263  Governments should not discourage those activities. 
Until labor laws can make having a family compatible with a career, there will be a trade 
off between labor force participation rate and fertility rate.
The most  economically beneficial  person is  someone who is  born  at  22 with 
valuable skills then disappears as soon as they retire.  Such a person does not exist except 
as a guest worker.  The guest worker's home country shoulders education costs but the 
host country reaps the benefits of their skills.  When they retire, they return to their home 
country to live on its pension system.  It sounds too good to be true, and it is.  
The downsides are one, guest workers remit a large portion of their income home, 
away  from  the  host  country's  consumer  economy.   Two,  guest  workers  in  liberal 
democracies tend to stick around,264 which 3) negates some of the fiscal benefits and 
could cause social problems.  When guest workers start families in the host country, it is 
nearly impossible to break up families.  Moreover, long-term foreign residents challenge 
democratic ideals because they participate in society yet have no voice in policy.  With 
guest workers, there is no consent of the governed other than the choice to be a guest 
worker, which after putting down roots and starting a career is not much of a choice. 
Therefore while  guest worker programs may seem the ideal solution to aging, policy 
management is tricky to obtain the desired outcome.
The next best economically beneficial person is someone who is born at 22 with 
valuable  skills  and  lives  to  enjoy  retirement.   Such  a  person  is  represented  by  the 
immigrant who becomes a citizen.  The home country bears the burden of education from 
which  the  host  country  reaps  the  profit.   Remittances  are  slightly  less  because  the 
263 David E. Bloom, et. al., "Fertility, Female Labor Force Participation, and the Demographic Dividend", 
Journal of Economic Growth 14, 2 (2009): 93-96. Web: doi: 10.1007/s10887-009-9039-9
264 Philip L. Martin and Michael S. Teitelbaum, "The Mirage of Mexican Guest Workers" Foreign Affairs 
80, 6 (2001): 119.
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immigrant is more likely to start a family in the host country.  They benefit from all 
government services.   France, however,  requires 40 years of paying in to its pension 
system qualify for a full pension.
Once again reality is more complicated.  The default view of all governments is 
that immigration is undesirable and should only be allowed for  humanitarian reasons 
(including refugees and family reunification) or to fill labor shortages like farm workers 
or  nurses.   No  country  has  open  borders  or  is  anything  close  to  them.   There  is  a 
political/social  price  to  each  immigrant  that  policy-makers  weigh  when  making 
immigration  policy.   A  nation's  level  of  xenophobia  plays  a  major  part  in  pushing 
population policy in the pro-natalist or immigration direction.  Even Singapore, where 25 
percent of its population were foreigners in 2010, has strong pro-natalist policies because 
the government fears the loss of Singaporean culture.
4.5 MOST EFFECTIVE PRO-NATALIST POLICIES
There is no consensus on what are the most effective ways to incentivize child-
bearing.265  Research on cash grants, extra government services, and family leave policies 
yield inconsistent results.266  Various policies have been shown by one study or another to 
have some effect, but there has been little comparison.  Moreover, chapter 3 shows that 
policy comparisons across countries are hard because each country has a unique set of 
economic and cultural circumstances.  Historically the most effective pro-natalist policy 
was to withhold family planning and abortion services.  This was what France and Japan 
265 Adriaan Kalwij, "The Impact of Family Policy Expenditure on Fertility in Western Europe" Network 
for Studies on Pensions, Aging and Retirement Discussion Paper 01/2009 - 07 (2009), web, accessed 24 
Mar. 2011: <http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=92913>> 
266 Ibid; Also: Anna C. d'Addio and Marco M. d'Ercole, “Trends and Determinants of Fertility in OECD 
Countries: The Role of Policies”, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 27, 
OECD Publishing. Web: doi: 10.1787/880242325663
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did during World War II, and how Romania under Communist leader Nicolae Ceau escuș  
achieved a dramatic rise in fertility in the late 1960s.267  But this kind of coercion is 
immoral and untenable in modern societies.
Nevertheless,  research  is  coalescing  around  cash  grants  and  a  family-friendly 
labor market as effective.  The higher women's participation in the workforce, the greater 
the opportunity cost to having a child, and the more effective family leave and flexible 
work hours will be.  If a country has high direct costs to getting married and having 
children, namely buying a house, then cash grants will be more effective.
Immigration from high fertility countries is one of the surest ways to increase 
fertility.  The United States and France have both benefited from this.  But immigration is 
often unpopular.  It goes against a common objectives of pro-natalism which is to sustain 
a specific culture, as is the case in Singapore and Japan.
4.6 REFORMS TO HELP OLD AGE SUPPORT SYSTEMS COPE WITH AGING
Short  of  maintaining a young and growing population,  developed nations will 
have to reform their old age support systems (pension and health care) in order to avoid 
overburdening the working cohort.  Singapore does this by having mandatory individual 
investment accounts with no risk-sharing.  What a worker puts in is what they get for 
retirement,  nothing  more  except  for  limited  Eldercare  stipends  and  a  private  sector 
pension if they have one.  Singapore has gotten away with this because they expect the 
children to take care of their parents and grandparents, shifting the burden of old age 
support from the public sector.  Western pensions exist to provide financial security to 
the elderly and thus redistribute money.
267 Michael S. Teitelbaum, "Fertility Effects of the Abolition of Legal Abortion in Romania." Population 
Studies 26, 3 (1972): 405-406. 
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France  is  expanding  its  version  of  the  individual  retirement  account  and  the 
American IRA and 401(k) are increasingly popular to supplement traditional pensions. 
These can soften the blow of reduced pension benefits in the future.  But in order to 
maintain the Western ideal of financial security for all seniors, some risk-sharing will be 
necessary.   This is where Japan's  pension reforms are useful.   They are moving to a 
hybrid defined contribution pension system with risk-sharing.  Contributions will be fixed 
at a flat payroll tax rate starting 2018 and benefits calculated based on available revenue. 
If revenue goes down, so do the benefits.  Political action would not be required to cut 
benefits.268  The benefits are still allotted according to basic needs and lifetime earnings. 
Other  developed nations can adopt this  system and amend it  so that if  revenues fall, 
benefits to the wealthy are reduced first.
Returning to the individual retirement accounts, these typically rely on equities 
for their value.  Economist Simon Kuznets predicted that an aging population will put 
downward pressure on equity prices as the retired gradually sell their assets to a smaller 
group of young buyers.  This will decrease capital and harm the economy.  A solution is 
to  open up a country's  financial  markets to foreigners.   This is  not a problem in the 
developed  world  but  much  of  the  developing  world  still  puts  restrictions  on  foreign 
investment, especially real estate.269  Real estate is a common nest egg for retirement so 
allowing foreign ownership of land will keep prices high despite an aging population.
Index  pension  benefits  to  fertility.   More  children  nets  a  beneficiary  higher 
benefits and fewer children lower benefits.  This would achieve three goals: incentivize 
children, tie the old age support system directly to the demography that supports it, and if 
higher fertility is not achieved, reduces old age benefits automatically.  The idea that 
268 Sakamoto, 5.
269 M. Sornarajah. The International Law on Foreign Investment, 3rd ed. Cambridge UP: Cambridge, 2010. 
P. 132.
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citizens get back what they paid in is barely true for the current pay-as-you-go systems. A 
system in which fertility determines old age benefits would be more true to that idea 
because the beneficiary's children are paying taxes at the same time the beneficiary is 
receiving benefits.  The beneficiary “paid in” by shouldering the costs of raising a large 
family.  The downside is it may be viewed as punishing those who choose small families, 
are infertile, and would mean a less secure old age support system.
Raise the retirement age, but not too much.  Residents of developed nations have 
benefited from greatly increased life expectancy but much of that comes from improved 
medical care that increases the chance one lives to 65.  American life expectancy at birth 
increased  11  years  between  1950  and  2006  while  life  expectancy  at  65  increased  5 
years.270 Japan's life expectancy at birth gained 20 (men) to 24 (women) years from 1950 
to 2009 while life expectancy at 65 gained 7 to 12 years.271  Pension systems exist to 
prevent the elderly from falling into poverty in old age after they are too old to work.  
This role used to be fulfilled by the retirees' children.  The fiscal problem for pensions is 
not so much that people are living longer, but that more people are living to retirement 
with fewer supporting workers per beneficiary.
Singapore hides the fiscal challenges of aging by offloading most of the costs of 
elderly care on families.  Supporters claim it promotes individual responsibility and is 
sustainable,  unlike  pay-as-you-go  systems.   This  is  misleading  because  Singapore's 
elderly depend heavily on their extended family for financial support.  It is common for  
270 Elizabeth Arias, "United States Life Tables, 2006" National Vital Statistics Report 58, 21 (2010). Web, 
accessed 23 Mar., 2011, <http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr58/nvsr58_21.pdf>.
271 "Abridged Life Tables for Japan 2008" Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. Web, accessed 23 Mar. 
2011. <http://www.mhlw.go.jp/za/0723/b09/b09.pdf>. And: "Abridged Life Tables for Japan 2009." 
Statistics and Information Department. Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. Web. 15 Mar. 2011. 
<http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/database/db- hw/lifetb09/index.html>. And: "2-36: Expectation of 
Life by Sex and Age." Chapter 2 Population and Households. Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. 
Web. 23 Mar. 2011. <http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/database/db- hw/lifetb09/1.html>.
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several generations to live under one roof.  Thus Singaporean workers face similar but 
uneven burdens to support the elderly.  In Western nations, they pay taxes to support 
pension systems.  In Singapore, they take care of the elderly in their home.  This model is 
politically unsustainable in light of Singapore's cultural and demographic trends.  Youth 
increasingly want greater independence from their families.   They are having smaller 
families.  Both the young and the old will pressure the government to take a larger role in 
caring for the elderly.  Some kind of re-distributive old age support system is likely in the 
future that has the same challenges as Western systems.
Create  a  tax-expenditure  limitation  (TEL)  on  old  age  benefits.   Japan's  2004 
reforms capped the pension contribution rate at 18 percent payroll tax in 2017 and will 
divvy up whatever  revenue is  collected to  retirees  according to  the existing formula. 
Japan's system is not a pure TEL because benefit levels have to remain at a certain level 
which will probably create a revenue shortfall in the future.  The advantage of a TEL is it 
would automatically cut benefits without contentious political debate.  The disadvantages 
are it would make retirement planning more difficult because benefits are not guaranteed 
and each generation might feel cheated that they are getting less out of it than they paid 
in.
Index pension benefits  to  age,  with benefits  starting at  a  very  low amount  at 
retirement  and  increasing  with  age.   This  makes  sense  in  the  context  of  pensions' 
objective which is to prevent poverty and maintain a decent quality of life for the elderly.  
The newly retired are healthier and have more savings than they long-retired.  It would 
save  money  by  targeting  benefits  at  a  population  that  most  needs  them,  reduce  the 
number of beneficiaries receiving a full pension, and tax benefits.
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Reform the labor market to make it easier for seniors to delay retirement, then 
keep working part-time after retirement.  The United States does well in this area.  Social 
Security and Medicare allows beneficiaries to work as much as they want and still receive 
full  benefits  after  65.272  Transition  to  a  knowledge-based  economy  will  help. 
Productivity for workers in a manual labor position will decrease with age while certain 
tertiary industries that put a premium on experience can benefit from age.  
One significant labor reform is to get away from seniority-based wage systems 
because  it  leads  to  overpaying  older  workers  and  making  them  less  attractive  to 
employers.  Research shows productivity tends to peak at age 50, then decline, while 
wages continue to grow.273  This indicates older workers are overpaid.  Employers do this 
to  encourage younger  workers  to  stick with the  company and minimize  the  costs  of 
recruitment  and  training.274  Older  workers  with  seniority  are  less  of  a  risk  to  quit. 
Companies underpay younger employees to account for that risk.  Theoretically, a worker 
should  receive  adequate  compensation  for  their  productivity  over  their  entire  career, 
underpaid at the beginning and overpaid at the end.  But this means companies often have 
mandatory retirement, an economic distortion and bad fiscal policy.275
Because both employers and employees have rational grounds for accepting this 
system, reform will be hard.  One way is to ban mandatory retirement.  Employers know 
this would allow older workers to continue to be overpaid for a long time and force 
employers to tie their  wages to productivity.   In turn,  this would raise young worker 
wages as companies could no longer dangle the carrot of future seniority bonuses.  It 
272 "You Can Work and Get Social Security at the Same Time" Social Security Administration, 09 Feb. 
2011. Web, accessed 23 Mar. 2011. <http://www.ssa.gov/retire2/whileworking.htm>.
273 Jan C. van Ours and Lenny Stoeldraijer, "Age, Wage, and Productivity" Institute for the Study of Labor 
Discussion Paper No. 4765 (2010). Web,  accessed 23 Mar. 2011, <http://ftp.iza.org/dp4765.pdf>. P. 20.
274 Ibid., 2.
275 Edward P. Lazear, "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?" Journal of Political Economy 87, 6 (1979): 
1261.
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would require a shift in attitudes among older workers and in many cases union rules. 
Companies will still try to incentivize loyalty to the company which makes more senior 
workers overpaid and thus a target for cost-cutting.  More research should be done on 
how to encourage companies and workers to continue working into old age.
The  politics  of  old  age  support  systems  will  be  increasingly  polarized  along 
generational lines.  In order for them to remain solvent, governments will have to choose 
between cutting benefits and raising taxes on the younger working cohort.  When these 
systems looked fine decades ago, younger workers were happy to vote higher benefits for 
the  elderly  knowing they would  enjoy the  benefits  themselves  one day.   But  as  the 
younger generations increasingly fear they will not get what they paid in, there will be 
major political battles.  Developing nations would be wise to heed the experiences of 
developed nations and adopt pro-growth population policies and/or sustainable old age 
support systems before the demographic “anti-dividend” hits.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Total fertility rates for Singapore, the United States, France, and 
Japan: 1960 – 2008
Source: UN Population Division
Year Singapore United States France Japan Year Singapore United States France Japan
1960 5.454 3.654 2.727 2.001 1985 1.614 1.844 1.823 1.76
1961 5.256 3.62 2.807 2.05 1986 1.433 1.8375 1.843 1.72
1962 5.2 3.461 2.783 2.01 1987 1.621 1.872 1.8 1.69
1963 5.007 3.319 2.883 2.02 1988 1.956 1.934 1.8 1.66
1964 3.19 2.901 2.05 1989 1.754 2.014 1.79 1.57
1965 4.698 2.913 2.834 2.139 1990 1.865 2.081 1.78 1.54
1966 4.498 2.721 2.776 1.58 1991 1.77 2.0625 1.77 1.53
1967 3.946 2.558 2.644 2.02 1992 1.76 2.046 1.73 1.502
1968 3.562 2.464 2.57 2.13 1993 1.778 2.0195 1.65 1.458
1969 3.246 2.456 2.529 2.13 1994 1.75 2.0015 1.65 1.5
1970 3.086 2.48 2.484 2.135 1995 1.71 1.978 1.713 1.422
1971 3.038 2.266 2.505 2.16 1996 1.696 1.976 1.733 1.425
1972 3.048 2.01 2.429 2.14 1997 1.635 1.971 1.726 1.388
1973 2.8 1.879 2.323 2.14 1998 1.494 1.999 1.764 1.384
1974 2.359 1.835 2.125 2.05 1999 1.475 2.0075 1.793 1.342
1975 2.079 1.774 1.927 1.909 2000 1.4425 2.056 1.88 1.359
1976 2.111 1.738 1.828 1.85 2001 1.41 2.034 1.89 1.33
1977 1.82 1.79 1.861 1.8 2002 1.37 2.013 1.88 1.32
1978 1.759 1.76 1.821 1.79 2003 1.27 1.89 1.29
1979 1.791 1.808 1.855 1.77 2004 1.26 2.045 1.9 1.29
1980 1.737 1.8395 1.945 1.75 2005 1.26 2.054 1.92 1.26
1981 1.723 1.812 1.945 1.74 2006 1.28 2.1 1.98 1.32
1982 1.706 1.8275 1.912 1.77 2007 1.29 2.1132 1.96 1.34
1983 1.608 1.799 1.787 1.8 2008 1.28 2.1 1.998 1.34
1984 1.615 1.8065 1.807 1.81
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